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 OF WOMAN BORN?1 — TECHNOLOGY, RELATIONSHIP, 
AND THE RIGHT TO A HUMAN MOTHER 
Jennifer S. Hendricks2 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the legal implications of a scientific 
fantasy: the fantasy of building artificial wombs that could gestate a 
human child from conception. It takes as its touchstone a claim by 
sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman, who writes, “Every human child 
has a right to a human mother.”  
While the article discusses the legal principles that would apply 
to artificial wombs, it is skeptical about the technological possibility 
of artificial wombs in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the focus 
of the article is the effect that the fantasy of artificial gestation has on 
the legal discourse around pregnancy and reproduction today. 
The article first places the fantasy of artificial gestation in the 
context of theories of reproduction propounded by western science. 
The history of scientific theorizing about reproduction is a history of 
male scientists’ efforts to prioritize the male contribution and 
minimize the degree to which men are dependent on women for the 
creation of their offspring. Feminist scientists and philosophers of 
science have demonstrated how sex-based ideology has skewed and 
hampered scientific efforts to understand the biology of 
reproduction. Scientific pronouncements about the prospects for 
building artificial wombs reflect the biases that have historically 
plagued reproductive science, making it likely that those prospects 
are systematically overstated. 
                                                          
1
 The title refer refers both to the riddle at the heart of Macbeth and to Adrienne 
Rich’s classic distinction between the institution of motherhood as a form of social 
control and the practice of mothering as individual expression and empowerment. 
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. 1 (Macbeth cannot be killed by 
any man “of woman born”); id. at act 5, sc. 7 (Macduff revealing that he was “from 
his mother’s womb, untimely ripp’d”); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: 
MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 13 (1976); see also ANDREA 
O’REILY, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO MOTHERING: THE LEGACY OF ADRIENNE RICH’S 
OF WOMAN BORN 2 (2004). 
2
 Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. Special thanks to 
my brother, S. Michael Hendricks, post-doctoral fellow in Organismic and 
Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, who guided me through the scientific 
issues discussed in this article while always reminding me not to expect science to 
provide answers to social and moral questions. For comments on earlier drafts of 
this article, thanks are also due to Cyra Choudhury, Shelley Cavalieri, Richard 
Delgado, and Jean Stefanic. 
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The article then turns to how legal discourse uses the prospect of 
artificial gestation to shape current practices regarding reproduction 
and control of women’s bodies. For example, legal scholars 
increasingly cite the prospect of artificial wombs as a solution to the 
controversy over abortion, since the fetus could survive without 
requiring the pregnant woman to sustain it. Pregnant women seeking 
abortions could instead be required to choose between continuing the 
pregnancy or undergoing an extraction procedure in which the 
embryo or fetus would be transferred to an artificial womb. This 
predicted “solution” informs legal analysis of the scope of 
reproductive rights today by constructing the woman and fetus as 
separate individuals with opposing interests. Similarly, comparisons 
between mechanical and human gestators shape legal rhetoric about 
commercial surrogacy and the legal control of pregnant women. 
Finally, the article reconsiders this legal-technological discourse 
about gestation from the perspective of a feminist project of re-
visioning the human condition as one of mutually dependent 
relationships rather than autonomous individuality. Feminists have 
demonstrated that the autonomous individual is a myth; the fantasy 
of artificial wombs is a psychic representation of that myth. It 
constructs motherhood in a way that minimizes the importance of the 
human connection of pregnancy. A child born through natural 
gestation or through individual-initiated artificial gestation enters the 
world with a claim to that connection; for the state to create a child 
through artificial gestation would be to create an intentional orphan, 
the family-level equivalent of a stateless person. Therefore, although 
this Article tentatively concludes that artificial gestation should be 
permissible as a means for individuals to reproduce, it rejects state-
mandated gestation as a moral alternative to abortion. Every child 
may not be entitled to a human gestator, but every child is entitled to 
a human parent, in the fullest sense of the word. 
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A theory about the stars never becomes a part of the being of the stars. 
A theory about man enters his consciousness, determines 
his self-understanding, and modifies his very existence.3 
 
This Article explores the legal implications of a scientific 
fantasy: the fantasy of building artificial wombs that could gestate a 
human child from conception. It takes as its touchstone a claim by 
sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman, who writes, “Every human child 
has a right to a human mother.”4 I understand her to make two claims 
in this statement:  
First claim: A child has a right to have her gestational parent 
recognized as her initial legal parent. Pre-birth adoption or 
surrogacy agreements should not be enforceable by specific 
performance.5 
Second claim: The child has a right to be gestated by a human 
being, not by “ectogenesis,” meaning gestation outside a 
person’s body, in either a machine or a non-human animal.6 
This Article supports the first claim but partially rejects the second 
from a feminist legal perspective. It connects this inquiry to the 
project of re-visioning the human condition as one of mutually 
dependent relationships rather than autonomous individuality. 
The first claim is the mirror image of an argument I have made 
in prior work, in which I have argued that a birth mother has 
constitutionally protected parental rights.7 Working within existing 
U.S Supreme Court precedent on parental rights, I have previously 
supported this claim from the adult perspective.8 This Article shows 
that the same conclusion is correct when considered from the child’s 
perspective. The parental right of the birth mother has a counterpart 
in the right of the child to legal recognition of the child’s first human 
relationship.9 
                                                          
3
 Abraham Joshua Heschel, quoted in Athena Beldecos et al., The Importance of 
Feminist Critique for Contemporary Cell Biology, 3 HYPATIA 61, 73 (1988). 
4
 BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 257 (1989). 
5
 See id. at 254-56. 
6
 See id. at 257. 
7
 See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN 
& L. 429, 473-82 (2007). 
8
 See id.; see also infra, part III.A.1. 
9
 See infra, part III.A.2. 
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Of course, we can assign parental status to the birth mother only 
if she exists, which is guaranteed only if the second claim is also 
correct. Moreover, if artificial gestation is possible, as some 
scientists claim, then we must decide whether it should be 
encouraged, discouraged, or prohibited. 
The idealized possibility of ectogenesis already influences the 
way legal culture thinks about pregnancy, its regulation, and its 
commodification. To date, legal commentators have discussed the 
prospect of artificial gestation primarily as a potential solution to the 
problem of abortion.10 Some have also noted that artificial wombs 
would be an alternative to surrogacy, which has been criticized from 
a variety of perspectives.11 Although legal commentators have also 
noted potential legal or ethical problems with artificial wombs, the 
primary role of this technological prospect in legal discourse is as a 
beneficial development that will help resolve current legal conflicts. 
These expectations about resolving deep-seated problems and 
controversies through technology are overly optimistic. Artificial 
wombs, if understood as alternatives to human pregnancy, are as 
likely to be used to control rather than to liberate or empower 
women, especially women who are disadvantaged by race and/or 
class. 
While this Article discusses the legal principles that would apply 
to artificial wombs, it is skeptical about the technological possibility 
of artificial wombs in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the focus 
of the article is on the effect that the fantasy of artificial gestation has 
on the legal and scientific discourse around pregnancy and 
reproduction today. 
Part I of this Article describes the current lay of the land with 
respect to artificial womb technology: its definition, potential uses, 
and stage of development. 
                                                          
10
 See, e.g., Vernelia R. Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built In Obsolescence: The 
Coming End to the Abortion Debate, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 291, 307-08, 309 
(2008); PETER SINGER & DEANNE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE 
AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 119-20 (1985); Michael Buckley, Current Technology 
Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1221 
(1982); Mark A. Goldstein, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice 
Right and State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 877, 894 (1978); Ken Martyn, Comment, Technological Advances 
and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 1194, 894 
(1982). 
11
 See, e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 10, at 118-19. 
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Part II.A places the fantasy of artificial gestation in the context 
of theories of reproduction propounded by western science. The 
history of scientific theorizing about reproduction is a history of male 
scientists’ efforts to prioritize the male contribution and minimize the 
degree to which men are dependent on women for the creation of 
their offspring. Feminist scientists and philosophers of science have 
demonstrated how sex-based ideology has skewed and hampered 
scientific efforts to understand the biology of reproduction. Scientific 
pronouncements about the prospects for building artificial wombs 
reflect the biases that have historically plagued reproductive science, 
making it likely that those prospects are systematically overstated. 
The rest of Part II discusses how legal discourse uses the 
prospect of artificial gestation to shape current practices regarding 
reproduction and control of women’s bodies. For example, legal 
scholars increasingly cite the prospect of artificial wombs as a 
solution to the controversy over abortion, since the fetus could 
survive without requiring the pregnant woman to sustain it. Pregnant 
women seeking abortions could instead be required to choose 
between continuing the pregnancy or undergoing an extraction 
procedure in which the embryo or fetus would be transferred to an 
artificial womb. This predicted “solution” informs legal analysis of 
the scope of reproductive rights today by constructing the woman 
and fetus as separate individuals with opposing interests. Similarly, 
comparisons between mechanical wombs and human gestators shape 
legal rhetoric about commercial surrogacy and legal control of 
pregnant women. 
Part III proposes a different legal response to the prospect of 
artificial wombs, analyzing the possibilities through a lens that 
rejects the dichotomies that have traditionally structured and 
constrained legal discourse about reproduction. It puts the legal-
technological discourse about gestation in the context of a feminist 
project of re-visioning the human condition as one of mutually 
dependent relationships rather than autonomous individuality. 
Feminists have demonstrated that the autonomous individual is a 
myth12; the fantasy of artificial wombs is a psychic representation of 
that myth. It constructs motherhood in a way that minimizes the 
importance of the human connection of pregnancy. A child born 
through natural gestation, or even through individual-initiated 
artificial gestation, enters the world with a claim to that connection; 
                                                          
12
 See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2005). 
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for the state to create a child through artificial gestation would be to 
create an intentional orphan, the family-level equivalent of a stateless 
person. Therefore, although tentatively concluding that artificial 
gestation should be permissible as a means for individuals to 
reproduce, it rejects state-mandated or state-initiated gestation as a 
moral alternative to abortion or for any other purpose. 
 
I. THE FANTASY OF ARTIFICIAL GESTATION 
This Part introduces the proposals for creating artificial wombs 
that can be found in scientific and bioethics literature. Part I.A 
discusses what is meant by the term “artificial womb,” focusing on 
the use of artificial wombs for ectogenesis, meaning human 
reproduction that occurs entirely outside the body. Part I.B 
summarizes the benefits that proponents cite as justifying the 
development of artificial womb technology. Part I.C discusses the 
technical barriers to artificial gestation and argues that proponents 
tend to emphasize the challenges of providing basic fetal life support 
but gloss over the developmental challenges that ectogenesis would 
entail. This point provides the foundation for Part II, which shows 
that this imbalance reflects long-standing gender bias that has 
frequently skewed reproductive science. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
What is an “artificial womb”? 
If a child could be created from gametes without ever growing 
inside a person, the device that accomplished this feat would be 
considered an artificial womb. Such freestanding gestation is the 
ultimate goal of a few scientists who have designed their research 
specifically to that end.13 The technology that might accomplish this 
goal comes from two, more general lines of research: First, the 
technology of in vitro fertilization and other research on embryos has 
lengthened the period of time a fertilized egg can be kept alive and 
developing in a laboratory. Second, medical science strives to save 
premature infants at increasingly early points of delivery. If these 
two lines of research eventually meet somewhere in the middle, we 
will have artificial wombs capable of complete ectogenesis—the 
                                                          
13
 See infra, Part I.C. (discussing the work of Drs. Kyoshinori Kuwabara and 
Hung-Ching Liu). 
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creation of a human child without any period of gestation in a 
woman’s body.14 
 At least some proposed uses for artificial wombs involve more 
modest technological ambitions and are akin to neonatal medicine. 
An embryo or fetus that began its development inside a woman 
might be transferred to the device at some point during pregnancy.15 
That possibility raises the question: What are the features that would 
make such a device qualitatively different from current neonatal-ICU 
technology and thus warrant the designation “artificial womb”? 
One distinction may lie in the nature of the technology and the 
underlying science. In the last few decades, technology has pushed 
back the survival age for premature infants by a few weeks and 
improved the survival rates within that period.16 Many scientists 
believe they are reaching the limit of current technological 
approaches, due to the need for a threshold level of lung 
development before an infant can tolerate artificial ventilation.17 To 
move the point of viability further back in pregnancy would require a 
quantum leap, a qualitatively different technology that would support 
the infant more comprehensively. For example, it might involve 
providing oxygen other than through the lungs, and it might require 
                                                          
14
 See Scott Gelfand, Introduction, in ECTOGENESIS 1, 2 (Scott Gelfand & John R. 
Shook, eds., 2006) (discussing the convergence of these two lines of research as 
the most likely path to complete ectogenesis); STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF 
ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION 5 
(2004) (same).  
15
 Transfer from a pregnant woman to a machine might be desired for medical 
reasons or in lieu of abortion. Proposals to use artificial wombs as alternatives to 
abortion are discussed infra, Part II.B. Depending on how the technology develops, 
a mid-pregnancy transfer to a machine might be either more or less difficult than 
mechanical gestation for the full term. 
16
 See Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late 
Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J. 1451, 1452-1453, 1461 (1984); Paul Reidinger, Will Roe v. 
Wade Be Overruled?, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (1988) (“The gist of all this is that the point 
of viability does not seem to be moving inexorably backward as Justice O'Connor 
suggested, indeed has moved barely at all since Roe was decided. The rates of 
survival for premature infants jump dramatically in most studies between the 24th 
and 28th weeks. One recent study showed that while only 20 percent of infants 
born at 24 weeks survived, 83 percent of those born at 28 weeks did.”). 
17
 See Rhoden, supra note 16, at 1465-66 (“At present, fetal lung development is a 
limiting factor for neonatal survival because an infant whose lungs completely lack 
surfactant cannot survive.”). 
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submersion in a liquid that simulates amniotic fluid.18 This 
technology might strike us as visually very similar to natural 
gestation. We would think of the submersion container as an 
artificial womb even if it could not substitute for a woman’s body for 
the entire period of pregnancy. 
Another basis for distinction might lie in our beliefs or practices 
regarding the status of the fetus. We may collectively be inclined to 
deem a device an artificial womb, rather than merely another piece of 
neonatal technology, if it is able to take over from the human mother 
early enough that the embryo or fetus does not yet seem visually like 
a baby.19 
This Article focuses on the prospect of true artificial wombs: 
human-made machines that can perform all the functions of 
gestations. There are also proposals for what we might call quasi-
artificial wombs, which straddle the definitional borders between 
artificial gestation, surrogacy, and surgical cures for infertility. 
First, there is the possibility that an artificial, human-made 
womb could function inside a person’s body. A woman or man who 
was not otherwise able to gestate could use the device to do so. 
Depending on the path of technological development, this could be 
either more difficult than freestanding gestation (because it would 
require miniaturization of the device) or less difficult (because it 
would involve supplementing existing organs and bodily processes 
rather than building a device from scratch). The former path of 
development would necessarily take us through all of the questions 
and problems raised by complete ectogenesis. The latter path would 
be relatively unproblematic from a legal and cultural perspective, 
since the use artificial components could easily be understood as 
                                                          
18
 Alternative means of providing oxygen have been tried but have not yet 
surpassed ventilation as a means of effective treatment. See infra, notes 57-61 and 
accompanying text. 
19
 Cf. Joyce M. Raskin & Nadav Mazor, The Artificial Womb and Human Subject 
Research, in ECTOGENESIS 159, 168 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, eds., 2006) 
(“We will become more sympathetic and attribute greater moral value to the fetus, 
growing in a glass tank, as it gains the shape of a human being.”); Goldstein, supra 
note 10, at 894 (arguing that a fetal development standard should replace viability 
as the cutoff for legal abortion); Martyn, supra note 10, at 894 (1982) (same). This 
line of distinction is discussed further below, in connection with the effect of 
artificial wombs on abortion rights and the concept of viability in abortion 
doctrine. See infra, Part II.B. 
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treatment for infertility.20 We would not have to face the unique 
questions raised by ectogenesis, since children would still be gestated 
inside an existing person’s body. 
Second, non-human animals could be used to gestate human 
infants. Most writers appear to consider this option ethically more 
problematic, even if it may be technologically easier, as compared to 
gestation in a machine.21 
Third, women who are brain dead or in a persistent vegetative 
state could serve as gestational surrogates.22 Women could be asked 
in advance whether they would be willing to gestate a fetus after 
their own brain death, in the same way that people today are asked to 
consent to be organ donors.23 Doctors have already successfully 
sustained pregnancies in women who were raped while in a 
vegetative state24 and others who were already pregnant when they 
                                                          
20
 See Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making 
Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 (arguing that society is more willing to accept 
reproductive technologies that are perceived as cures for disease); ROTHMAN, 
supra note 4, at 257 (supporting gestational technology used within the body, 
including by men, but opposing extracorporeal gestation) (“Men are free to 
develop the technology to become mothers.”). Use of an artificial womb by a 
person otherwise considered male would raise cultural and legal questions similar 
to those that were raised in recent popular discussions of a pregnant transgendered 
man. 
21
 See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 1-2 (excluding non-human gestation from the 
scope of discussion in a book-length treatment of ectogenesis because the use of 
animals raises additional ethical issues). Coleman does not specify whether he 
perceives the additional issues as pertaining to the animals’ interests, the humanity 
of the resulting child, or both. For an interesting discussion of legal and cultural 
concerns about the use of animals in human reproductive processes, see Maneesha 
Deckha, Holding On to Humanity: Animals, Dignity, and Anxiety in Canada’s 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 5 UNBOUND 21 (2009).  
If animal gestation were pursued, it would involve large mammals such as 
cows or horses, since other primates are too small to gestate human babies. The 
challenges presented by differences in bodily systems and nutritional requirements 
would thus be even greater than would be present with primate systems. When 
asked about the prospects for gestation by a non-human animal as compared to 
gestation in a machine, one development biologist told me that use of an animal 
would be “definitely easier, I think, but also impossible.” Personal communication 
from S. Michael Hendricks, 9/25/10; see also Coleman, supra note 14, at 1 
(positing a cow or donkey as the likely animal). 
22
 See Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21 THEORETICAL 
MED. & BIOETHICS 153, 164-65 (2000). 
23
 Id. at 165. 
24
 See Daniel A. Manion, Rights That Are Wrong, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 
(1996) (describing a case involving rape of a comatose woman); Doe v. Westfall 
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experienced brain death.25 Initiating and staging an entire pregnancy 
by IVF in a brain dead woman would likely pose additional 
challenges, but it would be easier and cheaper than inventing and 
building gestation machines.26 
B. USES AND BENEFITS OF ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 
Most scientists whose research could lead to ectogenesis are 
focused on developing treatments either for infertility or for 
complications of pregnancy and premature birth.27 Bioethicists and 
legal commentators, however, have identified additional benefits that 
may flow from artificial gestation. 
If artificial wombs were widely available, they could release the 
women who used them from the risks and burdens of even normal 
pregnancy, without transferring those risks to other, lower status 
women.28 Artificial wombs could therefore be seen as a liberating 
technology for women. For example, Shulamith Firestone famously 
called pregnancy “barbaric” and looked forward to the day when 
technology would free women from the physical demands of 
reproduction.29 She believed that sex equality would not be possible 
until technology equalized the sexes when it came to making 
                                                                                                                                      
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 755 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (ruling on a tort 
suit involving rape of a patient in a chronic vegetative state). 
25
 Julien S. Murphy, Is Pregnancy Necessary? Feminist Concerns About 
Ectogenesis, 4 HYPATIA 181, 183-84 (2009); James M. Jordan, III, Note, 
Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and 
Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1107-1109 (1988). 
26
 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 184 (noting that the doctor in one case, who was 
prepared to obtain a court order if any relatives of the brain-dead woman tried to 
intervene, stated that the woman had no legal rights and that the bodies of brain-
dead women are “the cheapest incubators we have”); cf. Jordan, supra note 25, at 
1165 n. 25 (comparing the costs of neonatal intensive care to the cost of 
maintaining a pregnant, brain-dead woman on life support). 
27
 Ethicists often cite medically indicated surrogacy as the primary use. See, e.g., 
SINGER & WELLS, supra note 10, at 118; Rosemarie Tong, Out of Body Gestation: 
In Whose Best Interests?, in ECTOGENESIS 59, 70 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, 
eds., 2006) (“[Because many women value a genetic connection with a child,] and 
because of serious concerns I have about one woman using another woman’s body 
to make a baby for her for money, I am prepared to accept the better surrogacy 
argument in favor of ectogenesis.”). 
28
 Contract surrogacy has been criticized for transferring these risks to lower-status 
women. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 65-68 (1997). 
29
 SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION 198 -199 (1970). 
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babies.30 Importantly, Firestone did not believe that the technology 
of artificial gestation, standing alone, would be liberating; she 
advocated radical restructuring of society, including abolition of the 
family as an institution, with freedom from pregnancy only one 
factor supporting women’s equality.31 Other feminist writers, 
however, have more directly hailed reproductive technology as a 
path to sex equality.32 By diminishing the mother’s greater role in the 
creation of a child, technology could free women from their 
disproportionate physical burden. It could also put men on an equal 
footing with women at the outset of family life, including by 
allowing men to reproduce without a female partner or gestational 
surrogate. 
It seems unlikely that elective use of artificial wombs would be 
available to any but the wealthy. Even medically indicated 
ectogenesis would be available only to the relatively well-off, as is 
true today for expensive treatments for neonates and for infertility. 
That more options are available to those with higher incomes is, of 
course nothing new, so an argument against ectogenesis on those 
grounds is no different from a similar argument against any advanced 
reproductive technology.33  
Proponents of artificial wombs have also argued that artificial 
gestation would be safer for the fetus than human gestation under a 
range of circumstances. Some of these proposals predictably reflect 
current debates about control of pregnant women, suggesting that 
                                                          
30
 Id. at 238. 
31
 Id. at 8-9; see also Murphy, supra note 25, at 191 (arguing that Singer and 
Wells’s claim that the technology would be liberating “ignores the theory of 
revolution implicit in Firestone’s support for ectogenesis”). 
32
 See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 297; but 
see Randall & Randall, supra note 10, at 307-08, 309 (arguing that apparent 
equalization would have disproportionate effects on women, especially poor 
women and women of color). 
33
 See Joan Woolfrey, Ectogenesis: Liberation, Technological Tyranny, or Just 
More of the Same?, in ECTOGENESIS 129, 130-33 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, 
eds., 2006) (arguing that ethical issues regarding resource allocation weigh heavily 
against pursuit of artificial womb technology); LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING 
PERSONS: ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 229-30 (1996) (suggesting that pursuing 
reproductive technology diverts resources from other health care needs and is “not 
just a matter of letting the wealthy decide how to use their disposable income”); 
but see COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 38-41 (responding to the resource allocation 
objection to reproductive technology). 
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women who are addicted to drugs or have other particular problems 
could be required to transfer their fetuses to artificial wombs.34 
Others have gone so far as to posit that ectogenesis would be safer 
for the fetus as a general matter.35 Artificial gestation would protect 
the fetus from various dangers in the “real world,” including 
irresponsible maternal behavior and “dietary fads” among pregnant 
women.36 The fetus would be nurtured in a scientifically designed, 
calibrated, and controlled environment, with exactly the right kinds 
and amounts of sustenance and stimulation. 
This construction of the pregnant woman as a threat to the fetus 
has been thoroughly critiqued in feminist legal literature.37 In the 
context of ectogenesis, the most important critique is of the 
arrogance of both the medical and legal establishments about what 
they think they know. Many “dietary fads” among pregnant women 
and mothers—say, the “fad” for formula over breast milk—originate 
                                                          
34
 See, e.g., Gregory Pence, What’s So Good About Natural Motherhood? (In 
Praise of Unnatural Gestation), in ECTOGENESIS 77, 82 (Scott Gelfand & John R. 
Shook, eds., 2006) (discussing women with drug addictions and HIV infection). 
35
 See id. at 82 (arguing that ectogenesis would allow for “careful monitoring and 
study of the best possible nutrients for the fetus”) (emphasis added); Edward 
Grossman, The Obsolescent Mother: A Scenario, 5 THE ATLANTIC 39, 48 (1971), 
cited in Amel Alghrani, The Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis, 2 
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 205 (2007) (“An efficient 
artificial womb, far from increasing the incidence of birth defects, would reduce 
them by keeping the foetus in an absolutely safe and regular environment.”). 
36
 Emily Jackson, Degendering Reproduction, 16 MED. L. REV. 346, 360 (quoting 
ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNER BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 179 (1999), and criticizing the view that fetuses need to be protected 
from their mothers as a general matter); see also Scott Gelfand, Ectogenesis and 
the Ethic of Care, in ECTOGENESIS 89, 102 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, eds., 
2006) (arguing that it is reasonable to assume that ectogenesis would be healthier 
for both the mother and the child and would protect the child from “second-hand 
smoke, alcohol, and an unhealthy diet”). 
37
 See Jackson, supra note 36, at 360-61 (applying those critiques in the context of 
ectogenesis); Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 
341-42 (1992) (arguing that “selective regulation of women’s conduct is justified 
on the grounds that pregnant women have a unique physical capacity to harm 
children, when the regulation may in fact reflect the view that pregnant women 
have a unique social obligation to protect children”); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Children: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
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with the medical industry.38 Rothman explains the risks of relying on 
mass-scale, technological solutions to complex and difficult 
questions about creating and sustaining life: 
We cannot know who will be right, but we do know that, 
inevitably, anyone making these decisions will sometimes 
be wrong. To me, it comes down not to whose judgment we 
trust, but whose mistakes. … Why, then, do I trust the 
idiosyncratic mistakes of parents? Precisely because they 
are idiosyncratic. The mistakes of medicine and those of 
the state are systematic, and that alone is reason not to 
trust.39 
For these reasons, claims that artificial wombs should be welcomed 
as superior to human gestation should be greeted with skepticism. 
Even if ectogenesis is inferior to natural gestation, it might be 
good enough to serve as an alternative to abortion. In the case of 
medically necessary abortions, the artificial alternative would be 
analogous to neonatal care. There might also be situations in which a 
woman who today might give birth and place the child for adoption 
would strongly prefer an earlier divestiture.40 For the most part, 
however, writers who posit artificial gestation as an alternative to 
abortion contemplate outlawing abortion and requiring women to 
instead undergo a fetal extraction and transfer procedure.41 
Finally, artificial wombs could be used to create stem cells, 
organs, and other spare parts, rather than for the complete gestation 
of a new person.42 This potential use raises many additional 
                                                          
38
 See Tong, supra note 27, at 65-66 (summarizing the history of the medical 
establishment’s assertion of control over pregnancy, including telling pregnant 
women “when to eat, sleep, exercise, have sex, and the like”); Linda C. Fentiman, 
Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New 
Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formulas, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 36-38  (2010) 
(describing the medical industry’s promotion of formula over breastfeeding). 
39
 ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 193. 
40
 For example, a woman who was opposed to abortion but became pregnant 
through rape might find the alternative of artificial gestation to be an acceptable 
compromise. 
41
 See, e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 10, at 119-20. 
42
 This might be feasible on a part-by-part basis, or it might require the intentional 
creation of brain-dead, but otherwise complete, individuals. See SINGER & WELLS, 
supra note 10, at 132-35 (describing and partially rejecting this potential use of 
artificial womb technology). Singer and Wells argue that embryos could be used 
for these purposes as long as they are not yet in any way sentient. Id. at 133. On the 
prospect of creating intentionally brain-dead individuals to circumvent that barrier, 
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questions, and ethicists and other commentators reject most such 
uses of artificial womb technology.43 Accordingly, this Article 
focuses on true ectogenesis designed to substitute for the gestation 
and birth of a child. Of course, that technology, once built, would 
also have the potential to be used for research and organ replacement 
purposes. Indeed, if artificial womb research is pursued, therapeutic 
and research uses would likely become feasible before complete 
ectogenesis is possible.44 
C. TECHONOLOGICAL PROSPECTS 
Since at least the 1920s, scientists have claimed that the 
technological capacity for ectogenesis is imminent,45 but the years 
                                                                                                                                      
they acknowledge that this would be permissible under their utilitarian framework 
but “emphatically urge caution” because of the potential collateral effects on 
people’s ability to bond with infants. Id. at 133. For a more detailed discussion that 
concludes with a more emphatic rejection of this path, see COLEMAN, supra note 
14, at 161-65. 
43
 See works cited, supra note 42. 
44
 Technically, the “spare parts” endeavor does not require an artificial womb; a 
live woman could work just as well. Presumably, not enough women would be 
willing to serve in this capacity for it to become widespread. See Raskin & Mazor, 
supra note 19, at 166 (“[C]onsidering that the in vitro fetus is no longer protected 
by the natural shield of a female womb, it is further exposed to the scientific 
hunger for research than the in vivo fetus.”).  However, a woman might want to do 
so if it were herself, her own child, or another family member who was in need of 
tissue or a transplant. Cf. Fazal Kahn & Brian Lea, Paging King Solomon: 
Towards Allowing Parents to Donate Organs of Anencephalic Infants, SSRN 
(discussing the use of encephalitic infants as organ donors and proposing a ban on 
the intentional creation of encephalitic fetuses). 
45
 Tong, supra note 27, at 60-61 (summarizing from SUSAN SQUIER, BABIES IN 
BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
(1995)). The earliest documented claim for artificial gestation was a sixteenth-
century recipe for creating a human form by allowing a man’s semen to putrefy in 
the sealed womb of a horse. The resulting creature, however, was believed to lack 
a soul. See Gelfand, supra note 14 at 3. Interest in and anticipation of ectogenesis 
has come in cycles, with a spate of interest in the 1920s, another in the 1970s and 
1980s, and the current cycle, which began around the turn of the millennium. See 
Tong, supra note 27, at 60-67 (describing the three periods). These cycles are 
reflected in spurt of interest in ectogenesis in law reviews in the late 1970s and 
again in the last five years. See Jessica H. Schultz, Development of Ectogenesis: 
How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 877 (2010); Eric Steiger, Not of Woman Born: How Ectogenesis Will 
Change the Way We View Viability, Birth, and the Status of the Unborn, 23 J.L. & 
HEALTH 143 (2010); Randall & Randall, supra note 10 (2008); Jackson, supra note 
36 (2008); Alghrani, supra note 35 (2007); Buckley, supra note 10; Martyn, supra 
note 10 (1982); Goldstein, supra note 10 (1978). 
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come and go and no artificial wombs are built. Great progress has 
been made in both embryonic research and care for premature 
infants. However, recent anticipation of ectogenesis among ethicists 
and legal scholars appears to be overly optimistic. 
The most frequent announcements of imminent ectogenesis have 
been made by non-biologists writing about law or ethics rather than 
by scientists themselves.46 Recent popular and academic discussions 
of the advent of artificial wombs typically cite the same two 
researchers, Dr. Kyoshinori Kuwabara of Juntendo University, 
Tokyo, and Dr. Hung-Ching Liu of Cornell University, New York 
State.47 Dr. Kuwabara’s research approached ectogenesis from the 
direction of fetal survival, trying to push back the point of viability 
for premature babies. He predicted in 1997 that partial ectogenesis—
from the sixteenth week of pregnancy—would be possible in about 
ten years.48 Dr. Liu worked from the other direction, developing 
techniques for maintaining embryos and encouraging them to 
implant in artificial environments. She, too, has predicted that her 
techniques would lead to complete artificial wombs within a few 
years.49 Both of these lines of research are provocative enough to 
capture press attention periodically.50 Indeed, their work continues to 
                                                          
46
 Gelfand, supra note 14, at 1; SINGER & WELLS, supra note 10, at 118; Steiger, 
supra note 45, at 144; Goldstein, supra note 10, at 880; Martyn, supra note 10, at 
1244. 
47
 See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 11; Schultz, supra note 45, at 881-82; Alghrani, 
supra note 35, at 194-95; Randall & Randall, supra note 10, at 297; Jackson, supra 
note 36, at 358. 
48
 See Gelfand, supra note 14, at 2. 
49
 See id. at 2. 
50
 Those of us who are interested in the legal and ethical problems of artificial 
reproduction may be eager to seize on the promise of technological imminence. 
For example, Stephen Coleman’s book devoted to ectogenesis canvasses the state 
of current research in the field. COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 5-14. His survey 
includes the usual citations to the work of Dr. Kuwabara, as well as  an embryo 
study by Dr. Carlo Bulletti in Bologna. The only other current research cited is 
what Coleman describes as “the theoretical work of Dr. William Cooper,” as 
evidenced by a 1991 patent application for a “placental chamber.” Id. at 12. As 
best as I can determine, Dr. Cooper is an obstetrician with no apparent research 
credentials who practiced in Tulsa, Oklahoma under the business name Christian 
Fertility Institute. According to the website of the Oklahoma Medical Board, his 
license was revoked in 1998 following disciplinary actions in Georgia and 
Pennsylvania for “failure to provide a proper setting and assistive personnel for 
medical act,” “fraud obtaining license credentials,” and “unprofessional conduct.” 
See www.okmedicalboard.org/licensee/MD/15621 (last visited 12/21/10). 
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be cited even though Dr. Kuwabara died in 2000 and Dr. Liu has not 
published her results.51 
Technical barriers to creating artificial wombs can be thought of 
as falling into two categories: life-support barriers and 
developmental barriers. “Life-support barriers” refers to the 
difficulties involved in artificially performing the ordinary bodily 
functions that the developing body cannot yet do for itself. These are 
familiar from neonatal intensive care: the body must have 
mechanisms for absorbing oxygen, taking in nutrients, and expelling 
waste. “Developmental barriers” refers to difficulties in directing the 
growth of a fertilized egg so that it correctly follows the path from 
embryo to fetus to healthy infant. 
Before describing these challenges, I hasten to add that the 
dichotomy between life-support barriers and developmental barriers 
is artificial. In natural gestation, the uterus performs both life-support 
and developmental functions, and it would be difficult to draw a 
clear line between the two categories. My distinction between the 
two categories is intended only to draw attention to a feature of legal 
and ethical discussions of artificial wombs. Discussions of the 
technological prospects for ectogenesis tend to focus on the life-
support barriers that are familiar from neonatal care. While these 
discussions acknowledge the concern that artificially gestated fetuses 
will experience developmental problems, they generally do not treat 
embryo development as one of the functions of the uterus; the 
implicit assumption is that if the life-support functions are performed 
correctly, proper development will occur. In Part II, I argue that this 
implicit assumption reflects a long-standing ideological view of 
reproduction that is likely inconsistent with the scientific facts. 
From a life-support perspective, one challenge for artificial 
gestation is to replicate the placenta. The placenta is the medium for 
fetal inputs and outputs: nutrition, oxygen, and waste.52 A successful 
artificial womb would be able to perform the functions of the 
placenta, as well as protect the fetus with something akin to amniotic 
                                                          
51
 See Alghrani, supra note 35, at 194 (noting Dr. Kuwabara’s death and that Dr. 
Liu’s work was unpublished). A member of Dr. Kuwabara’s research team stated 
that their approach might be able to push the point of viability back to twenty 
weeks but that he personally had no plans to pursue that line of research. See 
Alghrani, supra note 35, at 194. 
52
 COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 7 (describing the functions of the placenta). 
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fluid.53 Neonatologists have had greatest success when they approach 
such tasks in a manner that mimics ordinary gestation, rather than in 
a manner that attempts to treat the newborn as one would treat a fully 
developed infant.54 For example, doctors deliver nutrition to very 
premature infants intravenously, rather than relying on their 
incomplete digestive systems.55 Similarly, their fragile skin is 
protected by a moist environment or even by creams that can mimic 
amniotic fluid.56 The exception is the provision of oxygen.57 
Premature babies are typically treated with high-frequency 
ventilators that supply oxygen through the lungs rather than through 
the bloodstream.58 This requires additional treatment to encourage 
the lungs to develop as quickly as possible.59 Although in the past 
there has been research on how to mimic the provision of oxygen 
through the placenta, the techniques that were developed failed to 
out-perform ventilators because the equipment could not be made 
small enough for the infants’ blood vessels but still large enough to 
transport sufficient oxygen.60 The need for sufficient lung 
development to tolerate a ventilator is thus the most significant factor 
in setting the current limit of fetal viability.61 
Given the difficulties of recreating the uterine environment in 
order to sustain a mid-term fetus, it almost begins to look easier to 
rely on natural processes by initiating the pregnancy in vitro and 
allowing the mechanisms for sustaining the fetus to develop 
organically. If an embryo could implant in an artificial container that 
behaved like a womb, the blood vessels and other connections 
                                                          
53
 Id. (“The amniotic fluid acts to regulate foetal temperature, to prevent 
dehydration, and as a barrier to infection.”). 
54
 Id. (“When treating extremely premature newborns, neonatologists attempt to 
mimic the uterine function when treating problems of these types.”). 
55
 Id. at 7-8. 
56
 Id. at 8. 
57
 See COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 9 (“The treatment of respiratory problems in 
premature infants is clearly quite different from the treatment of most other 
problems, as the treatment relies exclusively on the body system that is responsible 
for oxygenation of the blood after birth: the lungs.”). 
58
 Id. at 8-9. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 9-11. 
61
 See Pence, supra note 34, at 85 (“For thirty years, viability of the lungs of the 
premature baby has been the absolute barrier to progress towards an artificial 
womb. Reports of success using liquids to substitute for the mother’s placenta have 
usually been exaggerated.”). 
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necessary for sustaining life could grow themselves. In this scenario, 
the difficulty would lie in directing fetal development: the artificial 
womb would have to deliver the correct hormones and growth 
factors at the correct times.62 This developmental challenge, 
however, has received little attention in the popular, ethical, and 
legal literature about artificial gestation, which focus on life-support 
issues.63 There is an underlying assumption that providing the proper 
climate and nutrition will enable the embryo’s development to unfold 
naturally and of its own accord. As shown in Part II, this assumption 
is more ideological than scientific. 
Contemplating artificial gestation from a developmental 
perspective also has important implications for ethical barriers to this 
sort of research. When the focus of research is on life-support 
measures for saving premature infants, there are opportunities for 
doctors to experiment with new methods. If an infant is certain to die 
without intervention, even an untested technique can be tried, and 
thereby become tested.64  By contrast, experimentation is more 
fraught when it attempts to simulate the maternal-fetal signaling that 
shapes development. Errors may or not be detectable immediately 
and could result in seriously damaged children. Moreover, many 
developmental cues are likely to be species-specific, so animal 
experimentation may not provide an adequate basis for extrapolating 
to humans.65 
Even if developmental barriers were overcome, at least some of 
the proposed uses for artificial wombs would require more 
sophisticated technology. For example, in order for artificial 
gestation to substitute for abortion, scientists would have to return to 
the problem of recreating placental connections once the original 
placenta has been severed from the natural womb. They would also 
                                                          
62
 See Jackson, supra note 36, at 358 (describing Dr. Liu’s research agenda and 
explaining that directing the development of organs in the early embryo would be 
more difficult than later life-support tasks). 
63
 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 5-13 (as background to a book on the 
ethics of artificial gestation, describing life-support issues in detail without 
mentioning hormonal or other developmental processes). 
64
 This is not to suggest that all ethical decisions about the treatment of imperiled 
newborns are easy ones. They are, however, beyond the scope of this Article. 
65
 Personal communication from S. Michael Hendricks, 9/25/10; cf. Mark A. 
Rothstein, Yu Cai, and Gary E. Marchant, The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and 
Ethical Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 22 (2009) (noting that 
epigenetic changes tend to be species-specific and even tissue-specific). 
 OF WOMAN BORN? 
 
 
20 
 
have to develop techniques for safely removing the embryo or fetus 
from the pregnant woman. In order for artificial wombs to be a 
plausible alternative to most abortions in the United States, these 
techniques would have to be usable in the first trimester. At this 
stage, the embryo or fetus is already embedded in the uterus but is 
still quite small and not highly differentiated, both of which would 
make locating and transferring it difficult. 
In the end, the best argument for the likelihood of ectogenesis is 
generalized faith in scientific progress and capacity: science has 
accomplished many things that would have been thought impossible 
before they were done; why should this be any different?66 That is 
not an argument, however, for expecting the technology to be 
available in the near future. Moreover, as a counterweight to this 
presumptive optimism, consider the example of infant formula as a 
substitute for breast milk.67 Formula is generally considered an 
adequate nutritional substitute when breast-feeding is not possible.68 
In recent years, however, evidence has accumulated about the 
relative health benefits of breastfeeding for both mother and infant. 
Simulating breast milk is a vastly simpler scientific endeavor that 
simulating gestation. The desired end-product can be sampled and 
tested without limit, and the goal is merely to replicate that 
substance. Yet this goal has not been met, despite decades of 
research funded by a robust market in formula sales. It is difficult to 
imagine that scientists are on the verge of offering up an artificial 
womb that is equivalent or superior to human gestation when they 
have not yet produced a convincing substitute for lactation. For these 
reasons, this Article is skeptical of the technological prospects for 
ectogenesis in the foreseeable future. The ideological history of 
reproductive science discussed in the next Part provides further 
grounds for skepticism. 
                                                          
66
 See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that the first successful cloning of 
a sheep took many scientists by surprise); Alghrani, supra note 35, at 192 
(invoking this reason for expecting success with ectogenesis). 
67
 Cf. Maureen Sander-Staudt, Of Machine Born? A Feminist Assessment of 
Ectogenesis and Artificial Wombs, in ECTOGENESIS 109, 118 (Scott Gelfand & 
John R. Shook, eds., 2006) (“[S]cientists … have not even been able to identify, 
much less duplicate, all of the components of breast milk.”). 
68
 See NAOMI WOLF, MISCONCEPTIONS: TRUTH, LIES, AND THE UNEXPECTED ON 
THE JOURNEY TO MOTHERHOOD 268-71 (2001) (describing the benefits of 
breastfeeding but criticizing advocates who treat it as a “moral imperative” for 
putting too much pressure on women). 
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II. THE FANTASY AS A DREAM DIARY 
A dream diary is a journal in which a person records her dreams, 
usually for the purpose of gaining insight into her own psychological 
state and processes. The practice of keeping a dream diary is based 
on the theory that our dreams reflect and reveal our psyches. This 
Part argues that the legal/scientific fantasy about artificial wombs 
can be read as a dream diary, reflecting and revealing a prevailing 
ideology about sex, gender, and reproduction. 
Part II.A situates the science of artificial wombs in the history of 
reproductive science. Feminist scientists and philosophers of science 
have demonstrated how sex-based ideology has frequently skewed 
and hampered scientific efforts to understand the biology of 
reproduction. In particular, since Aristotle, reproduction has been 
theorized through a series of related dichotomies that minimize the 
role of gestation: the physical versus the spiritual or cognitive; the 
passive versus the active; the female versus the male; and the 
pregnant woman versus the fetus. Expectations for building artificial 
wombs reflect these dichotomies and the bias that has plagued 
reproductive science, making it likely that those prospects are 
systematically overstated. 
On the strength of that bias, the fantasy of artificial wombs has 
become part of the legal discourse around reproduction. The word 
fantasy here refers not only to an ambition but to the creation of 
“unrealistic or improbable images in response to psychological 
need.”69 Even if ectogenesis is unlikely to be possible in the near or 
even the foreseeable future, legal analysis is already anticipating the 
possibility and is affected by that anticipation. Parts II.B and II.C 
discuss how this anticipation informs legal discussion of abortion 
rights and commercial surrogacy. By examining the cultural and 
scientific fantasy of creating artificial wombs, we can better 
understand current ideology about pregnancy and reproduction. 
A.  THE IDEOLOGY OF REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCE 
My mother used to say that women made a mistake when they 
let men know they had anything to do with making babies. The 
disclosure, however, was probably unnecessary. The history of 
western reproductive science is a history in which men have rarely 
underestimated their own role in reproduction. Despite what would 
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 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 449 (1988). 
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seem to be overwhelming evidence to the contrary, they have long 
theorized their role as greater and more important than women’s. 
Only in the last century or so has women’s lesser contribution (and 
general inferiority) ceased to be an axiom of scientific inquiry.70 
Relaxation of that axiom has coincided with and gradually 
enabled better science. Nonetheless, early assumptions die hard. The 
scientific, legal, and ethical speculations about ectogenesis reflect the 
same biases that have long permeated reproductive science. It is 
therefore likely that the prospects for building artificial wombs are 
overstated. 
1. From Ancient Times: Theorizing Reproduction Through 
Aristotle’s Dichotomies 
Western reproductive science begins with Aristotle, whose 
model of conception is reminiscent of Genesis.71 Just as God formed 
Adam from the dust of the earth, Aristotle believed that men’s semen 
contained the motive force that acted upon the raw materials 
contained in the woman to form a new being.72 His model thus 
established two dichotomies as the basic framework for 
understanding reproduction: a dichotomy between the active male 
and the passive female and a second dichotomy between the 
immaterial life force of the man and physical body of the woman. 
Although some other classical theorists believed that both parents 
contributed to fetal development, “they uniformly held that woman’s 
contribution was weaker than that of man.”73 
Aristotle’s model of reproduction is considered “epigenetic.” in 
that it supposes the embryo to be “newly produced through gradual 
development from unorganized material.”74 The organizing motive 
force comes from the outside and gives form to the raw materials. 
Epigenetic models of reproduction fell out of favor in the 1700s 
because they appeared to require a non-mechanical, spiritual force to 
                                                          
70
 Cf. Nancy Tuana, The Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 
HYPATIA 35, 41 (1988) (“We can see from such inconsistencies in Aristotle’s 
theory that the doctrine the female sex was inferior to the male was not a premise 
to be proved or justified, but was rather an implicit belief underlying Aristotle’s 
development of his biological theory and an axiom upon which he founded his 
theory of reproduction.”). 
71
 See id. at 38 (making this comparison). 
72
 See id. 
73
 Id. at 41. 
74
 SHIRLEY A. ROE, MATTER, LIFE, AND GENERATION: 18TH CENTURY 
EMBRYOLOGY AND THE HALLER-WOLFF DEBATE 1 (2002). 
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mold the new being. Enlightenment scientific theory favored the 
clockwork universe.75 The epigenetic theory of reproduction was 
thus replaced by “preformation” doctrine.76 Preformationists 
believed that fetal development consisted of the “growth or 
unfolding of pre-existing structures.”77 
Originally, preformationists believed that the form of the fetus 
was contained within the mother’s egg, and that the father’s semen 
provided the trigger to stimulate growth.78 It followed that an egg 
contained a series of Russian nesting dolls, with all the generations 
of humanity contained originally in Eve’s eggs. However, this 
“ovist” view of reproduction was “almost uniformly rejected” once 
sperm was observed and recognized as the male analogue to the 
egg.79 The pre-existing fetus was quickly transferred to the sperm. A 
famous eighteenth-century illustration of the preformationist view 
depicts a tiny man squatting in the head of a sperm, his own head 
either replaced by or enclosed in an oversized bulge.80 This small 
creature was believed to take root and grow in the mother “just as the 
seed does in the field.”81 
Female inferiority continued to function as an axiom to justify 
preformationist theory. Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles and 
a proponent of preformation, held that “the embryon is produced by 
the male, and the proper food and nidus by the female.”82 As support 
for his view that the female contributes no part of the embryo, he 
offered a proof by contradiction: If the female as well as the male 
helped to constitute the embryo, then her overall contribution would 
be greater than the male’s; she would give both form and nutrition, 
he only form. That cannot be. QED.83 The pre-existing embryo thus 
                                                          
75
 Tuana, supra note 70 at 51. 
76
 Id. at 51 (“The idea of an evolution of complexity from unstructured material 
lost favor toward the end of  the seventeenth century as a result of the general 
scientific commitment to a mechanistic worldview and the insufficiency of 
mechanical explanations of the gradual development of living organisms.”); ROE, 
supra note 74, at 4 (describing Rene Descartes’s unsuccessful effort to reconcile an 
epigenetic theory of reproduction with a mechanistic, particle-based theory of 
matter). 
77
 Tuana, supra note 70, at 51. 
78
 Id. at 52. 
79
 Id. at 52-53. 
80
 Id. at 54 
81
 Id. at 55. 
82
 Id. at 55-56 (quoting Erasmus Darwin). 
83
 Id. at 55. 
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assumed the role of Aristotle’s motive force, while the pregnant 
woman remained a source of nutrients and other raw materials for 
sustaining growth. The dichotomy between these two parental 
contributions remained intact. 
2. The Modern Era: Preformation and Genetic Determinism  
Scientific discoveries can be hard on human sensibilities. 
Sigmund Freud explained, 
In the course of centuries the naïve self-love of men has had 
to submit to two major blows at the hands of science. The 
first was when they learnt that our earth was not the centre 
of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system 
of scarcely imaginable vastness. … The second blow fell 
when biological research destroyed man’s supposedly 
privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the 
animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature.84 
Freud posited his own theories of the unconscious as the third major 
blow, “prov[ing] to the ego that it is not even master in its own 
house.”85 Freud’s theories never having attained a level of scientific 
acceptance equivalent to evolution or the Copernican model, a better 
candidate for the third great blow to man is the discovery of DNA in 
human eggs, which proved that the sexes contributed (at least86) 
equally to the genetic makeup of their offspring. 
Preformation theory had required that the motive force for a new 
being come from either the mother or the father, since the new being 
was envisioned as already complete. Like the ancients, the 
preformationists assigned the father this role, and they pointed to 
active, swimming sperm as the vehicle for placing the new being 
inside the mother.87 With the discovery that DNA resided in both the 
sperm and the egg, scientists and society at large were forced to 
                                                          
84
 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916), IN JAMES 
STRECHY, ED., 16 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 284-85 (1963). 
85
 Id. 
86
 In addition to downplaying gestation as discussed in this Part, the popular 
cultural belief that a mother and father contribute equally to a child’s DNA appears 
to be impervious to the discovery of mitochondrial DNA, which comes only from 
the egg. See W. Nicholson Price, Am I My Son? Human Clones and the Modern 
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 Tuana, supra note 70, at 52-53. 
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accept that women contribute not just raw material but also design 
plans. 
Recall that Darwin’s grandfather rejected this possibility 
because it led to the absurd result of the woman having a greater role 
in reproduction than the man.88 Disproof of old-fashioned 
preformation did not mean that the culture was willing to concede 
that greater role. It avoided doing so by translating preformation into 
genetic determinism.89 With the new understanding of DNA, the 
fetus could no longer be thought to have pre-existed the pregnancy. 
Instead, the essence of the fetus was its newly formed set of DNA, to 
which mother and father contributed equally. Thus, the fallback 
position, still in effect today, was to deny women’s greater role in 
reproduction and insist on equality by minimizing the importance of 
gestation and equating biological parenthood with the contribution of 
nuclear DNA.90 
The continuity between preformation and modern genetic 
determinism can be seen in the metaphors that continue to influence 
our understanding of reproduction today: Preformationists believed 
that the little being inside the sperm “develo[ped] in the mother just 
as the seed does in the field.”91 Into at least the late twentieth 
century, children were taught that babies are made when “daddy 
plants a seed” in mommy.92 The lay cultural understanding of 
reproduction, and to some extent the scientific understanding, is 
rooted in a DNA-based version of preformation. 93 
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 See supra, notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
89
 Other scholars have observed the continuity between old-fashioned preformation 
doctrine and modern genetic determinism. See, e.g., Jane Maienschein, Cloning 
and Stem Cell Debates in the Context of Genetic Determinism, 9 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 565, 574-75 (2009) (discussing “the preformism of genetic 
determinism”). 
90
 See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 36-37 (“When forced to acknowledge that a 
woman’s genetic contribution is equal to a man’s, Western patriarchy was in 
trouble. But the central concept of patriarchy, the importance of the seed, was 
retained by extending the concept to women. … Women do not gain their rights to 
their children in this society as mothers but as father equivalents, as equivalent 
sources of seed.”). 
91
 Tuana supra note 70, at 55 (quoting a 1930 text of reproductive theory). 
92
 Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 
HASTINGS L.J.  1241, 1244 (1996) (“In Western patriarchal societies the classic 
where-do-babies-come-from tale we tell children is a variation  on ”Daddy plants a 
seed in Mommy.”). 
93
 See Maienschein, supra note 89, at 575 (arguing that some scientists and the 
public were caught off guard by the success of cloning in part because they 
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The continuity extends back to Aristotle and his dichotomy 
between the active, spiritual force of the father and the raw material 
of the mother. In addition, a parallel dichotomy stretches forward to 
shape the cultural construction of reproductive activities. Barbara 
Katz Rothman and Dorothy Roberts have both described the cultural 
division of mothering work into what Roberts calls “spiritual” and 
“menial” categories.94 This division allows privileged women to 
participate in public life while maintaining their identities as 
mothers; they can perform the spiritual role of mothers while hiring 
lower-status women to perform the menial tasks.95 Rothman points 
out that this dichotomy enables higher- status women to assume 
privileges that are traditionally male without challenging the basic 
structure of privilege that constructs our gendered experiences of 
reproduction and care work.96 
Today, DNA is thought of as a blueprint or design—something 
more cognitive than physical.97 As the design force, it is valued as 
the “spiritual” essence of identity and individuality. Once a new set 
of DNA is created in a zygote, it implants in the mother, and its 
developmental process unfolds, under the guidance of its own unique 
set of DNA. We think of the fetus’s relationship with “the maternal 
environment” as similar to our own relationship with our 
surroundings. The mother is a source of needed inputs and outputs—
food, oxygen—and protection from certain harms. She provides 
basic, “menial” services. The new being is, however, essentially 
complete, preformed. As discussed in Part II.B and II.C, this 
conception of the embryo as essentially complete, merely waiting to 
unfold, has important implications for the law’s approach to issues 
such as abortion and surrogacy. It is, however, an overly simplistic 
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and systematically skewed model for understanding the creation of a 
new being. 
3. The New Epigenetics: Science Resists the Dichotomies 
In biology, epigenesis is on the rise once more, challenging and 
complicating the genetic determinism that took hold during the 
twentieth century. Today, the field of epigenetics studies how genes 
interact with environmental factors that influence gene expression—
whether, when, and how particular genes are turned “on” or “off.”98 
Rather than study the individual as a predetermined entity whose 
essence was fixed when the parents’ chromosomes combined in a 
particular way, biologists study development as a complicated 
interaction between genes and other factors. The environment 
contributes not just raw materials but also form. 
The interaction of genes and the environment breaks down the 
dichotomy between nature and nurture, between the cognitive 
blueprint and the physical implementation of a person. Importantly, 
epigenetics also challenges the prevailing cultural view that equates 
the genetic blueprint with parental inheritance and thus the essence 
of both identity and parenthood. The popular view is that genetic 
inheritance is fixed and that environmental factors, even if they 
operate on the genes, affect only the individual. The opposite, 
however, appears to be true. Epigenetic changes in gene expression 
affect not only the individual but also that person’s descendants. That 
is, environmental factors create heritable effects. Thus, a more 
formal definition of the modern field of epigenetics is “the study of 
heritable changes in gene expression that occur without a change in 
DNA sequence.”99 
For example, one frequently discussed study of epigenetics 
involved the genes and epigenetic mechanisms that control the color 
of a mouse’s fur.100 The diet of a pregnant mouse can be manipulated 
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so that her offspring are either black or yellow, even though they are 
genetically identical. More surprising, however, the difference in 
color is heritable: it persists into the next generation. The effect of 
the mother’s diet is not “just” a matter of an environmental factor 
affecting a particular offspring; it becomes part of the heritable 
“instructions” that are passed down from one generation to the next. 
A similar process was likely responsible for a phenomenon observed 
in humans after the Dutch famine of 1944.101 As one might expect, 
children who were in utero during the famine were adversely 
affected on several health measures. Surprisingly, however, the 
effect persisted into the next generation, with the children of the 
famine babies experiencing high rates of heart disease. 
Just as the early vision of preformation gave way to more 
nuanced genetic determinism, today’s science is not Aristotle’s 
theory of epigenesis. Epigenetics does not displace the chromosome 
as the primary mechanism of biological inheritance. It does, 
however, challenge genetic determinism and the dichotomy between 
genes and environment. In the context of pregnancy and gestation, it 
challenges the dichotomy between form and matter, between genetic 
identity and the supportive environment of the womb. 
This challenge to the genes-environment dichotomy should not 
be interpreted to mean that gestation is important because it can 
influence genetics. That conclusion accepts not only the dichotomy 
but the associated valuation of genes over environment as the 
determinant of identity. Rather, the conceptual dichotomy between 
genes and environment is a cultural construction that is often 
misleading. This dichotomy imagines genes as “instructions” or 
“blueprints,” imbuing them with a cognitive, almost spiritual quality. 
Genes are thus deemed superior to the merely physical, including 
gestation, as a basis for identity. This dichotomy is artificial and 
resonates with other dichotomies that have harmful social effects, 
including the dichotomy of gender. Chromosomes are not, in fact, 
“blueprints” or “instructions,” to be consulted by a self-aware 
builder. Chromosomes are substances that catalyze chemical 
reactions in complex ways to produce proteins; they are physical, 
tangible stuff. It is helpful, at times, for us to think of them 
metaphorically as “blueprints,” but we should not allow the metaphor 
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to replace the reality. Both gestation and the replication of 
chromosomes are physical processes that create us as ourselves. 
The prevailing understanding of pregnancy was formed through 
the lens of the artificial dichotomy between form and matter. In this 
understanding, the fertilized egg is self-contained and complete as a 
new, individual human being. The DNA in the genes provides the 
blueprint and operating instructions for turning the egg into a baby. 
The mother’s womb provides the raw materials and disposes of 
waste products. The embryo itself is thus self-executing. This 
construction of pregnancy makes an artificial womb seem relatively 
simple in concept, even if technically difficult to carry out. The 
technical problems would arise from complexity and from the 
microscopic scale of early development, but the basic tasks would be 
straightforward life-support tasks. 
This vision of fetal development, however, is warped by 
ideology. A gestating woman’s body shapes the fetus’s development 
in ways which cannot be starkly distinguished from genetic 
inheritance. This suggests that we could as easily think of artificial 
gestation as akin to reproduction with synthetic DNA, rather than 
merely the replacement of one machine with another. It is therefore 
likely that we are overestimating the feasibility of artificial wombs 
because science and culture have traditionally discounted the role 
that gestation plays in development. This does not mean that 
gestation is a mystical process that is inherently incapable of 
mechanization, any more than it is inherently impossible to 
synthesize usable DNA. But the dichotomy between genes and 
environment is not as simple as popular and legal discussions 
typically assume. Similarly, gestation is more complex and 
developmental than the traditional view of the pregnant woman as a 
container suggests. 
B. ABORTION 
Overestimation of the technological capacity for artificial 
gestation is not merely an artifact but also an implement of ideology. 
Invoking the prospect of artificial wombs accomplishes a rhetorical 
function that instantiates the genetic definition of parenthood, the 
individual personality of the embryo, and the perception of gestation 
as passive provision of life support. 
The most frequent example of this ideological process at work 
in legal analysis is the hypothesis that artificial womb technology 
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will eliminate the need for abortion and/or the right to abortion.102 
This inquiry begins as a thought experiment: What would the law of 
abortion be if there were artificial wombs?103 The point of such a 
thought experiment is to deepen analysis by separating issues that are 
entwined in real life; the question seeks to disentangle the right to 
end a pregnancy from the right to end the life of the fetus. The 
thought experiment, however, eliminates context; it posits the 
appearance of artificial wombs without considering the experimental 
path that would be necessary for them to be built. Moreover, the 
thought experiment is often presented as not merely a thought 
experiment but as an imminent reality to be prepared for. The 
promise of imminence gives the scenario extra power and suggests 
that it offers essential truth: Because we will soon have artificial 
wombs, we should analyze rights and relationships today with 
artificial wombs as part of our understanding of reality. This line of 
speculation reveals as much about current ideology as about the 
problems of the future. In particular, belief in the near-term invention 
of artificial gestation reflects an ideologically tinged tendency to 
degrade pregnancy. That belief, in its turn, reinforces ideology. 
Just as modern, gene-oriented views of reproduction derive from 
preformation doctrine, modern regulation of abortion derives from 
the preformationist period and its understanding of the embryo and 
fetus as essentially complete new beings. Opponents of abortion 
today continue to assert that life begins at conception as a matter of 
scientific fact. They insist that the combination of chromosomes 
created at conception is the essence of an individual human being, 
who needs only the opportunity to unfold over the course of nine 
months’ gestation.104 
Reva Siegel’s foundational work on abortion restrictions in the 
United States highlights the preformationist views on which the 
nineteenth-century anti-abortion movement was based. “Doctors 
premised their campaign on a scientific understanding of human 
development as continuous from the point of conception in which 
‘quickening’ had no special significance.”105 They analogized the 
fetus to a baby kangaroo or breastfeeding baby, arguing that the fetus 
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was autonomous and not even actually attached to the woman.106 The 
embryo was described as “self-sustaining” and “self-developing”: 
“Whatever it may become … is by growth and development of the 
original, and not by addition of new materials, or attributes.”107 This 
is a classic statement of preformation doctrine, made shortly before 
the advent of genetic determinism. As Siegel summarized, 
nineteenth-century doctors “defended the claim that life begins at 
conception with a claim that life developed by autogenesis.”108 Their 
theory of reproduction “systematically discounted women’s role in 
reproducing life.”109 
Opponents of abortion continue to rely on the genetic-
determinist version of preformation as the basis for their argument 
that abortion is the moral equivalent of murder. For example, Robert 
John Araujo’s argument against the right to abortion repeatedly 
invokes science as “inexorably” refuting Roe’s use of the term 
“potential life” to refer to a developing embryo or fetus.110 Similarly, 
Charles Lugosi begins his discussion of the question when life begins 
by asserting, “Science informs us as to the answer.”111 What science 
tells us, he says, is that a fertilized egg is a “unique individual” 
which will “develop according to its own genetic blueprint.” A 
zygote is “internally activated”—i.e., development is triggered by the 
genetic blueprint itself rather than by the gestational process—and 
the genome itself “ assumes control of the whole morphogenetic 
process from the beginning of embryonic development.”112 These 
claims are radically preformationist. According to Lugosi, the zygote 
proceeds to “execute a plan” that is best carried out “[u]ndisturbed 
by external intervention.”113 Ignored in this account are the zygote’s 
need for several external interventions: a uterine wall into which to 
implant; a protective bath of amniotic fluid; a constant supply of 
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nutrients, oxygen, and waste elimination facilities; and a complex 
array of hormones and growth factors, all of which are provided by 
gestation. The embryo is seen as directing its own course of 
development, in isolation from the other factors that influence its 
development. This insistence that the moral status of the embryo can 
be determined as a matter of scientific fact depends on a genetic 
determinist and genetic essentialist view of reproduction and 
individual identity. 
The ideological descendants of preformation doctrine thus 
continue to influence the abortion debate today. Moreover, the 
preformationist framing of the debate sets the terms of discussion 
even for those who accept Roe’s terminology of “potential life.” In 
the legal academy today, the primary fantasy of artificial wombs, 
including among those who support the right to abortion today, is 
that they will eliminate both the need and the justification for 
abortion rights.114 This discourse reflects and reinforces the 
preformationist theory of the fetus by positing that, throughout the 
entire course of pregnancy, abortion reflects a fundamental conflict 
of interest between the pregnant woman and the fetus. 
Picking up on the arguments of Judith Jarvitz Thomson,115 Larry 
Tribe,116 and others that the right to terminate a pregnancy does not 
necessarily include the right to ensure the destruction of the fetus, 
commentators have suggested that artificial wombs could free 
women from unwanted pregnancies while allowing their fetuses to 
survive.117 Artificial wombs that could allow termination of the 
pregnancy without the death of the fetus would “unbundle” the right 
to abortion.118 A woman would still have the right to end her 
pregnancy but would have no right to insist on the death of the 
fetus.119 
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Many such proposals assume that the rate of pregnancy 
terminations would remain constant if abortion were replaced by 
transfer to an artificial womb. If the fetus is to survive, however, the 
factors affecting the woman’s decision change. There is now a child 
to consider. Most women would prefer to endure the last few months 
of a normal but unwanted pregnancy, rather than to impose the risks 
of prematurity on a child. What little research exists on attitudes 
toward artificial wombs suggests that few women would consider 
them a realistic response to an unwanted pregnancy.120 Women who 
are opposed to abortion rights state that transferring a fetus to an 
artificial womb would be an immoral abandonment of maternal duty, 
even if it protected the life of the fetus.121 At the same time, women 
who support abortion rights reject artificial wombs for the same 
reasons that so many women choose abortion over adoption: they 
believe there is a relevant moral difference between a fetus and a 
baby and would be reluctant to give up a baby even if the pregnancy 
had been unwanted.122 Both groups of women saw themselves as 
responsible for making a moral choice regarding the potential child, 
and artificial gestation was inconsistent with how they perceived 
their obligation.123 Moreover, as with adoption, mandating 
ectogenesis would put the greatest pressure on women of color, 
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whose children fare the worst in the adoption and foster care 
system.124 
Most discussion of artificial gestation posits itself as 
preparatory. That is, we should discuss the prospect of artificial 
wombs not merely as a thought experiment but because we will soon 
have to face the prospect as reality. A world with artificial wombs, 
however, would be a different world in relevant respects than the 
world in which we live today. In particular, it would be a world with 
a history of the decisions, practices, and experiments that would be 
necessary to produce artificial wombs. That history, which we can 
ignore when we merely contemplate the fantasy of artificial 
gestation, would alter the cultural landscape around reproduction. 
Proposals to substitute forced ectogenesis for abortion treat the 
embryo and fetus as having a cognizable interest in being developed 
into a person, subject only to the woman’s right to control her body. 
They do so despite what appears to be an increasingly strong social 
consensus about the status of embryos in laboratories. Embryos are 
routinely destroyed or frozen indefinitely in the course of in vitro 
fertilization procedures. It is unthinkable that those embryos could be 
seized by the state and distributed to infertile couples in order to have 
babies. At most, courts have been troubled about whether one of the 
genetic contributors ought to have the unilateral right to use or 
dispose of the embryos.125 Yet, we entertain the possibility that the 
state would forcibly seize aborted fetuses, grow them in artificial 
wombs, and then either give the resulting children to their 
progenitors or place the children in foster homes or orphanages to 
await adoption. Proponents of building artificial wombs are 
necessarily advocating experimentation on embryos and fetuses at 
increasingly advanced stages of development. Why, then, do they 
simultaneously posit that once an embryo has been in a woman’s 
body, it acquires a right, or at least a legally cognizable interest, in 
being fully gestated? If the public interest in medical science justifies 
the destruction of large numbers of embryos that were created for 
precisely that purpose, it is unclear why a woman’s interest in 
controlling her reproductive life should be trumped by the state 
interest in the fetus’s potential life. 
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This argument overlooks a paradox of abortion jurisprudence 
that would be brought into sharper relief by the advent of artificial 
womb technology.126 Under the strange logic of current abortion law 
the fact that the fetus is viable justifies requiring the woman to 
continue the pregnancy. The right to elective abortion ends when the 
fetus reaches viability.127 Moreover, viability is defined by the 
current state of medical technology.128 That is, the existence of 
technology that would permit the fetus to survive outside the womb 
justifies requiring the pregnant woman to continue to sustain the 
fetus inside the womb. Nothing in the viability rule is tied to the 
affordability of the technology that would be required to sustain the 
fetus.129 Viability is treated as if it were a quality inherent in the fetus 
rather than a function of society’s ability and willingness to provide 
the necessary technology. Neonatal technology therefore performs 
two functions: first, its intended function, of saving babies in 
emergency deliveries; and second, its legal function of marking the 
viability line beyond which woman may be forced to remain 
pregnant in the absence of medical emergency. The existence of the 
technology eliminates the possibility of its being used, except in 
unintended emergencies. 
The availability of artificial wombs would make the abortion 
question harder, not easier.130 Why does the right to abortion 
currently end at viability?131 That appears to be the point at which we 
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deem the woman a mother and believe that she has a duty to continue 
to gestate. The current point of viability thus serves as a marker for 
when we roughly believe the fetus to have human status. In addition, 
viability currently occurs at approximately the same time that 
carrying to term becomes medically safer than abortion for the 
pregnant woman.132 For a Supreme Court that has never provided a 
convincing rationale for relying on viability, this coincidence 
provides convenient cover.133 The advent of artificial womb 
technology would force us to confront questions about viability and 
abortion more thoroughly than we have so far. 
For many women, an abortion is not a refusal to care for a child; 
it is a decision not to create a child.134 Imagining a machine that 
could create the child in a woman’s stead, however, helps construct 
abortion as refusal to provide sustenance to a life in being. The 
construction implies that refusal may be justified or within the 
woman’s rights, but it is nonetheless unfortunate that another 
(potential) life must pay the price for her refusal. This implicit 
presumption of a conflict of interest between the woman and the 
fetus is based on preformation doctrine. But calling the initial DNA 
contribution “nature” and everything else “nurture” is a cultural 
choice. At some point in pregnancy, it likely makes sense to think of 
the fetus as a separate being, but science cannot tell us when that 
moment occurs.135 For the same reason, technology will not resolve 
the political controversy over abortion rights. 
                                                                                                                                      
basis for using viability to define the scope of the right to abortion. See, e.g., Son, 
supra note 126, at 217-18; but see TRIBE, supra note 103, at 207 (mildly defending 
the viability rule). 
132
 See Rhoden, supra note 16, at 639, 640 n. 9 (calculating that as of 1983, 
abortion was safer than childbirth until at least the twenty-first week); Council on 
Scientific Affairs, American Medical Ass’n, Induced Termination of Pregnancy 
Before and After Roe v. Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity of Women, 
268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3231, 3232 (1992).  
133
 See Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 119, at 345 (“The right to elective 
abortion has thus suspended much of the pre-Roe debate over the medical 
conditions justifying therapeutic abortion.”). 
134
 See ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 123 (challenging the distinction between 
“contraception, not letting this month’s egg grow, and abortion, not letting this 
month’s fertilized egg grow). 
135
 See generally R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of 
Embryos, Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11 
(1995) (criticizing the work of the National Institutes of Health’s Human Status 
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C. COMMERCIAL SURROGACY 
While legal scholars have been interested in artificial wombs 
primarily as a state-mandated alternative to abortion, others have 
focused on the voluntary use of ectogenesis as an alternative to 
human surrogacy. In this context, the prospect of artificial gestation 
heightens concerns about commodification of children but reaffirms 
the appropriateness of commodifying gestation. 
The actual or potential availability of artificial wombs resonates 
with the ideology that supports commercial surrogacy. In the world 
of surrogacy, for example, “the woman gives the baby ‘back to the 
father,’ as if it came from him in the first place” in the classic 
preformationist sense.136 If gestation can be performed by machine, 
that provides reassurance that it is not a core or essential part of 
mothering.137 Pregnancy can be seen as “a mere biological function, 
… and not also as a human bond in formation of new life that can be 
had in no other way.”138 Using Dorothy Roberts’s terms, gestation 
becomes one of the “menial” tasks of mothering rather than one of 
the “spiritual” components that make motherhood a desirable 
state.139 The technological alternative also rationalizes thinking of 
the surrogate as a container, which in turn justifies controlling how 
she mothers the child she is creating.140 Artificial wombs can have 
these effects even before they exist, as long as we believe in their 
possibility and desirability. The fantasy is both a product of our 
cultural ideology of pregnancy and a means of sustaining that 
ideology. If we predict a future in which gestation is mechanical and 
controlled, then gestation can be today classified as part of “menial” 
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 ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 80. 
137
 See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction 
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 592,  619 (2002) 
(“This view of the primacy of genetics is only fed by attempts to render natural 
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 Murphy, supra note 25, at 192. 
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 Roberts, supra note 28, at 65-68 (“While the ‘surrogate’ provides the menial 
labor of gestating the fetus to term, the contracting wife is designated as the baby’s 
spiritual mother. … As the case of ‘gestational surrogacy’ illustrates, the 
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reproductive labor, as well as the racist valuation of genetic material.”). 
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 Cf. Murphy, supra note 25, at 192-93 (arguing that artificial gestation could 
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 OF WOMAN BORN? 
 
 
38 
 
mothering that can unproblematically be contracted out by those who 
can afford to do so. 
In a world with artificial wombs, human surrogacy would likely 
remain a more affordable alternative to the machine. The existence 
of commercial surrogacy alongside ectogenesis would invite 
comparisons regarding both cost and quality. With respect to cost, it 
would be interesting to see the effect of artificial wombs on current 
efforts to impose price caps on surrogacy. Although discussions of 
artificial wombs often refer to the likely cost disparity between 
human and mechanical surrogacy, no one has argued that price 
controls should be imposed to keep the price of ectogenesis 
artificially low, in order to ensure that the providers of that service 
are doing it altruistically, with the child’s best interests ultimately at 
heart. In contrast, that argument is routinely made about human 
surrogacy.141  
Price caps on surrogacy help to avoid the stigma of baby-selling 
and to ensure that the surrogate will be a “good mother” who will not 
negligently or recklessly endanger the health of the fetus. The market 
for surrogacy, however, is now global,142 which has several 
implications for its operation. Social similarity, including racial 
similarity, between the buyers and sellers of reproductive services is 
reduced, and the economic disparity is more pronounced.143 It 
therefore becomes more difficult to insist that the surrogate’s 
primary motivation is altruistic and that the payment is merely a 
form of reimbursement for expenses. In addition to more abstract 
concerns about commodification, this change presents the intended 
parents with a dilemma regarding quality control. As one might 
expect, trans-national surrogacy increasingly involves daily 
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 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for 
Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 244-47 (2009) (criticizing such arguments). 
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 See MSNBC, Surrogate Mother Business Booming in India (MSNBC television 
broadcast Feb. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23252624/print/displaymode/1098 (last visited Feb. 
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 See Lisa C. Ikemt. Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global 
Market for Reproductive Services, 27 LAW & INEQ. 271, 308 (2009) (noting that 
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Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, 
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mistakes—i.e., putting an embryo into the wrong woman). 
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supervision and control of the surrogate mothers to ensure the health 
of the babies they deliver.144 
In the reproductive technology industry, discoveries in 
epigenetics have met with predictable cultural responses. That is, the 
role of gestation in development has been either accepted or rejected 
depending on a person’s pre-existing ideology and/or financial 
interest. On the one hand, some businesses offering IVF with 
purchased ova have seized on epigenetic discoveries to help 
convince their clients that they are the “real” mothers of the children 
they bear, despite the prevailing cultural fixation on DNA. For 
example, the “Recipient Information Sheet” for one egg broker 
includes a section titled “Women who give birth to donor egg babies 
are the biological moms.”145 This section first discusses the 
importance of gestation, and the gestational mother, in providing the 
physical materials for constructing the child, explicitly invoking an 
analogy between the genes as blueprint and the gestational mother as 
builder.146 It then goes on to explain epigenetics and the regulation of 
gene expression. It concludes with the following passage, reassuring 
the gestational mother about her role: 
A donor egg baby gets her genes from the donor; she gets 
the ‘instructions’ on the expression of those genes from the 
woman who carries her to term. … 
The child who is born would have been a physically and no 
doubt emotionally different person if carried by his genetic 
mother. … 
The implication of epigenetics is that the child inherits 
characteristics from the woman who carries the child even 
if the original DNA comes from a donor egg. In other 
words the birth mother influences what the child is like at a 
genetic level – it IS her child.147 
On the other hand, women participating as both gestational 
mothers and intended mothers in surrogacy contracts reject this 
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 See Krawiec, supra note 141, at n. 109 and accompanying text (noting that “the 
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possibility. Responding to the passages quoted above, some 
participants on a surrogacy discussion board acknowledged “a fair 
bit o science” behind the claims, but others flatly rejected them and 
the underlying science as simply unacceptable.148 Interestingly, some 
participants appeared to feel it was necessary to reject the scientific 
claim about genetic influence in order to reject the social 
conclusion—“it IS her child.”149 On both sides, then, genes were 
seen as preeminent, so that genetic influence defined whose the child 
“IS.” This insistence on a biological answer to the question of 
ascribing parenthood is especially surprising and powerful in light of 
the fact that all the people in this discussion were involved in 
creating children through recently invented technologies that disrupt 
the biological mechanisms for reproduction in some fashion. 
The fantasy of an artificial womb depends on and maintains a 
patriarchal definition of parenthood and the reification of DNA as the 
essence of identity. The womb is seen as merely the maternal 
environment, separate from the fetus in the way we think of 
ourselves as separate from our environment. Genes, on the other 
hand, are imagined as cerebral rather than physical. They are a 
“blueprint,” not merely chemical chains that interact with nearby 
substances to catalyze particular reactions. Discoveries about the 
influence of gestation on development are assimilated not by 
increased respect for the process of gestation but by stepped-up 
efforts to control it, usually by controlling pregnant women.150 In this 
cultural climate, the fantasy of the artificial womb helps us deny that 
gestation also shapes who we are, which is crucial to denying the 
parental status of a surrogate mother. 
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 All About Surrogacy—Epigenetics—Importance of Birth Mother—What is 
your take on this?, available at 
www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=42386. One 
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III. BEING HUMAN AND BEING IN RELATIONSHIP 
This Part revisits the thought experiment of how artificial 
wombs should be regulated and how abortion rights would be 
affected by their invention. It does so through a lens that rejects the 
Aristotelian dichotomies and their corollary that there is an inherent 
conflict of interest between the pregnant woman and the fetus. It 
seeks to answer the question posed in the introduction: Does a 
“human child have a right to a human mother”?151 As background for 
discussing artificial gestation, Part III.A discusses the first aspect of 
this claim, arguing that when a human person gestates a child, both 
the gestator and the child have a right to legal recognition of their 
parent-child relationship. Part III.B turns to the case of artificial 
gestation. It concludes that there is not, at this time, sufficient basis 
to support prohibition of artificial gestation, although there are 
serious concerns that might justify a ban in the future.152 There is, 
however, a sufficient basis to prohibit state use of ectogenesis, 
including state-mandates ectogenesis as an alternative to abortion. 
Thus, although there is not necessarily a right to a human gestational 
mother, there is a right to a human parent. 
A. GESTATION AND INITIAL PARENTHOOD 
My previous work has argued in favor of constitutionally 
protected parental rights for gestational mothers. Part I.A.1, below, 
summarizes that argument. Part I.A.2 considers the question from the 
child’s perspective. It concludes that the child has a mirror-image 
right to recognition of her initial parent-child relationship with her 
birth mother. 
1. The Adult’s Perspective 
The conclusion that the gestational mother has constitutionally 
protected parental rights is based both on existing doctrine for 
identifying a “parent” and on the values that underlie constitutional 
protection for parents. 
With respect to doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that 
constitutional parental status is defined by biological parenthood plus 
the establishment of a caretaking relationship with the child.153 This 
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 ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 257. 
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 There are also strong moral arguments against making artificial gestation a 
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or using the technology. See Woolfrey, supra note 33, at 130-33; Purdy, supra note 
33, at 229-30. 
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“biology-plus-relationship” test was developed to address the 
parental claims of unwed fathers but was based on pregnancy and 
birth as the paradigm for a parental relationship.154 A man who 
satisfies the biology-plus-relationship test is entitled to parental 
recognition as a matter of sex equality.155 Men satisfy the “biology” 
requirement by their genetic contribution and the “relationship” 
requirement by participating in the care of the child. 
This test implies a relationship model of pregnancy.156 It 
requires men to engage in caretaking in order to obtain what a 
woman obtains by giving birth. The test thus posits pregnancy not as 
only a reflexive physiological function but also as a form of 
caretaking. It follows that a woman who gives birth to a child has 
constitutionally protected parental rights because she, too, has both a 
biological and a caretaking relationship with the child.157 
The biology-plus-relationship test is a good test for defining 
parental status because it serves the values that justify parental rights 
in the first place. The two primary justifications for parental rights 
are (1) at the personal level: the concrete, emotional connection 
between parent and child, which makes the parent likely to be an 
appropriate caretaker for the child and which often means that one or 
both would be traumatized if the relationship were severed and (2) at 
the systemic level: ensuring de-centralization and limited state 
control over child rearing, in order to protect cultural pluralism.158 
Roughly speaking, the biology prong of the test can be said to 
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correspond to the pluralism concern: because the state is limited in 
its ability to control people’s sexual and reproductive lives, relying 
on biology allocates children in a way that is insulated from 
manipulation by the state. Similarly, the relationship prong can be 
said to correspond to the more personal concern of preventing the 
state from inflicting “heart-crushing blow[s] to the pursuit of 
happiness”159 by separating parents and children who have 
established caretaking relationships. 
Using pregnancy as a paradigm for the establishment of parental 
rights does not mean that to become a parent by giving birth is 
superior to other ways of becoming a parent. Indeed, the point of the 
biology-plus-relationship test is that fathers who participate in caring 
for their children should be recognized as parents in the fullest sense. 
Moreover, the role that biology plays in establishing parenthood 
should make clear that the relationship model of pregnancy does not 
denigrate parenthood through adoption. Although some people place 
great emotional importance on genetic ties, others do not. The role of 
biology in the constitutional definition of parental rights is to insulate 
the initial allocation of parental rights from state manipulation. Some 
systems of foster care and adoption can threaten this value, such as 
when the state systematically removes children from a particular 
groups of parents.160 At the individual level, however, nothing in the 
relationship model of pregnancy assumes that pregnancy is superior 
to other forms of parental caretaking.161 To say that the gestational 
mother has parental rights does not mean that those rights are 
exclusive or that they are necessarily superior to other claims. 
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2. The Child’s Perspective 
For reasons similar to those discussed above, the child has a 
right to a recognized parental relationship with her gestational 
mother. From the child’s perspective, the choice of an initial parent 
should be governed by the concerns that parallel the two policies 
already discussed: the child’s interest in continuation of an 
established caretaking relationship and society’s interest in 
decentralized authority over child-rearing. The child’s right is the 
right to have the legal system recognize her gestational mother as a 
legal parent at the time of birth. 
a. The Child’s Right to a Legal Parent 
Modern notions of parental rights developed from a historical 
understanding of the child as akin to property, which would suggest 
that the right accrues only in favor of the parent.162 The child’s own 
interests, however, are increasingly paramount in the articulation of 
parental rights. Mary Pat Byrn and Jenni Vainik Ives have recently 
argued for recognition of a child’s right to be assigned to parents.163 
They argue that the child is a juridical person from the moment of 
birth but that the child does not have legal parents until they are 
legally assigned.164 In the paradigm case of the birth of a child 
conceived through heterosexual intercourse between married parents, 
the law operates simultaneously with the birth to designate the 
married couple as the mother and father.165 In an increasing number 
of other cases, however, the identity of the legal parents is not 
immediately secured at birth, and the child may be left in limbo 
while legal parentage is determined.166 Perhaps worse, the parental 
status assumed by the adults at the time of the birth might be 
questioned later in the child’s life, such as when a husband discovers 
years later that he is not the genetic father.167 
Byrn and Ives conclude that the state, as parens patriae, has a 
constitutional duty to assign the child to parents and that it must 
choose the people who are most likely to act in the child’s best 
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interests.168 They further conclude that the people most likely to act 
in the child’s best interests—and thus the people whom the state is 
obligated to recognize as legal parents—are the genetic parents of a 
child conceived through sexual intercourse and the intended parents 
of a child conceived through alternative reproductive technology.169 
“Intended parents” refers to the people intended at the time of 
conception; they would be identified in the contracts governing any 
arrangements for surrogacy or donated gametes.170 The genetic 
parents of sexually conceived children would be identified by DNA 
testing, which Byrn and Ives argue should be performed immediately 
after birth in all cases of sexual reproduction in order to definitively 
establish paternity.171 
This Article accepts and builds upon Byrn and Ives’s argument 
regarding children’s right to be assigned parents at the time of birth. 
It parts ways with their analysis, however, on the specifics of that 
right. Byrn and Ives correctly point out that both juridical persons 
and legal parents are constructs of the law.172 They also suggest that 
it makes sense to think of the juridical person coming into being and 
then being assigned legal parents by the state.173 It is not necessary, 
however, for these two steps to be separated in time. Rather, it would 
be better for the born child never to be without a legal parent. The act 
of birth both creates the child as a legal person and, as discussed 
below, creates the formerly pregnant woman as the child’s mother. In 
the eyes of the law, birth transforms a single legal person into two 
legal people, a parent and a child. The child’s constitutional rights 
are satisfied by awarding her one automatic parent: the woman who 
gave birth to her. 
This attribution of parental status is not based solely on the “best 
interests of the child,” the familiar test for custodial determinations 
in family law. There are other policies at stake, and the child’s 
interests are only one piece. Moreover, the child is not entitled to the 
best possible parents. When Byrn and Ives argue that the state must 
assign as parents the “people most likely” to look out for the child’s 
best interests,174 they do not suggest an individual evaluation of a 
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person’s potential merits as a parent to a particular child. Rather, the 
state must assign parenthood according to a rule that in most cases is 
likely to identify parents who have the child’s interests at heart. 
Thus, we assign parenthood in part according to our beliefs about the 
factual circumstances that would cause an adult to have a special 
feeling toward a particular child. These beliefs connect to cultural 
norms. Specifically, we have cultural norms that genetics, gestation, 
and use of reproductive technology to create a child all give rise to a 
duty toward the child and ought to kindle affection in the heart of the 
parent. Because the potential parents will in most cases subscribe to 
the same cultural norm, we can anticipate that assigning parenthood 
on these bases will generally result in choosing a parent who is 
motivated to do right by the child. In addition, as discussed above, 
reliance on a biological connection serves the pluralist interest in 
insulating the distribution of children from state control. 
The child’s interests and the other policies at stake can be 
satisfied by a constitutional right to have one legal parent recognized 
at the time of birth. Byrn and Ives agree that only one parent is 
necessary to satisfy the child’s rights.175 However, they argue for the 
two genetic parents to be constitutionally recognized in cases of 
reproduction through sexual intercourse.176 In cases using 
technology, they state that the contractually intended parents should 
be recognized; perhaps there could be one, two, or more such 
individuals, although Byrn and Ives realistically assume that in most 
cases there would be two intended parents.177 This approach is 
consistent with how most states treat parentage, but as a matter of 
constitutional law, guaranteeing rights to two genetic parents at birth 
would be a change. Under existing precedent, in cases of sexual 
reproduction, the mother has constitutionally protected parental 
rights. The father, however, has parental rights only if he satisfies the 
biology-plus-relationship test.178 Byrn and Ives’s approach would 
replace the biology-plus-relationship test with automatic parenthood 
for genetic fathers. 
                                                          
175
 Byrn & Ives, supra note 162, at 328. 
176
 Id. at 332. 
177
 Id. at 341-42. 
178
 For births within marriage, it is unclear whether the bare fact of marriage to the 
mother entitles the father to parental status, or whether the marital presumption 
exists at the state’s option. 
 OF WOMAN BORN? 
 
 
47 
 
Instead, the child’s entitlement should extend only to having one 
constitutional parent. A single constitutional parent provides the 
child with a person to look after her interests, and it ensures against 
state distribution of children according to its own criteria. Indeed, the 
pluralism concern may be best addressed by recognizing no more 
than one initial parent with constitutional rights. Other individuals 
may become entitled to be recognized as parents under the biology-
plus-relationship test, marital presumptions, or other standards. 
Allowing those additional relationships to develop after birth gives  
the initial parent the freedom to choose among a variety of possible 
family forms. 
In sum, the child has the right to have the state assign her to a 
legal parent at the time of birth, a person who can be expected to be 
responsible for and look out for the child’s interests. This person 
should be selected according to a rule that protects and encourages 
emotional attachments deemed natural and/or socially desirable. The 
rule should also be substantially free from state control, so that the 
state cannot invidiously manipulate which individuals or subcultures 
have the opportunity to rear children. 
b. Choosing the Gestational Mother 
If we accept that the child is entitled to a parent, we must decide 
how to select that parent. Because I have argued that the gestational 
mother is entitled to parental rights, it would be convenient, of 
course, to select her. The child’s perspective also supports that 
choice. 
The child’s interest lies in continuing the relationship with the 
gestational mother because she is the only person with whom the 
child has an individuated, personal caretaking relationship.179 The 
child’s entitlement to continue in relationship with the gestational 
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mother can thus be understood as an extension of the concept of a 
“social parent.”180 Many scholars have argued, and a few courts have 
held, that a person who develops a strong caretaking relationship 
with a child while acting as a parent should be recognized as a 
parent, even in the absence of biological ties or formal adoption.181 
The gestational mother is similar to the social parent except that she 
also has a biological tie. The difference is only that her caretaking 
occurred prior to birth. 
To many this distinction will seem crucial, not necessarily 
because the nature of caretaking immediately after birth is so 
different from pregnancy but because treating pregnancy as 
caretaking suggests that the fetus is a person. This inference is 
unnecessary, however, because a status that is defined by caretaking 
necessarily develops over time. In some contexts, the law needs to 
set a clear line that defines the status of a fetus. For reasons of 
history, tradition, and practicality, the moment of birth defines when 
the fetus becomes a juridical person.182 For reasons that are less 
clear, the point of viability defines the permissibility of abortion.183 
But there is no need for a clear legal line to mark a point in 
pregnancy at which a parent-child relationship exists. The fetus does 
not need a legal parent, nor would it make sense to assign a legal 
parent until the child is a separate legal person. The fetus can remain 
a developing person, and the parental relationship develops until the 
time of birth. 
At birth, the only existing, tangible human relationship on which 
a child can draw is with the woman from whom she has just 
separated. This concrete, factual basis for identifying the parent also 
resolves a contradiction in the argument for recognizing the child’s 
right to a parent in the first place. Byrn and Ives argue that the 
child’s right to a legal parent arises out of the state’s duty as parens 
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patriae. They limit the child’s right, however, to a single set of 
parents at the time of birth. They do not address any parens patriae 
duty that arises if the genetic or intended parents are dead at the time 
of birth, or if they die later. This limit is probably necessary in light 
of the fact that our society does not recognize a continuing right to 
replacement parents.184 However, the limit would not make sense if 
the obligation to identify parents arises solely from the state’s 
obligation as parens patriae. The state is parens patriae to an orphan 
as much as to a newborn. Why does it not have the same obligation 
to come up with some legal parents for the child? The answer is that 
even the newborn is not starting from scratch at the moment of birth. 
The parental relationship the state must recognize is already in place. 
The discrete moment of aloneness after birth, in which Byrn and Ives 
say a child exists but not yet a parent, need not exist.185 The law’s 
recognition of a parent-child relationship should be simultaneous 
with the creation of the child as a separate legal person. 
c. Other Possible Parents 
There are three alternatives to assigning parental status to the 
gestational mother. First, the state could select parents according to 
criteria of its own choosing; second, genetics; and third, contract. 
The problems with the first option are apparent; as to the others, 
although genes and contract may often have a role to play in 
determining parental status, they should not supersede the initial 
assignment of parental status to the gestational mother.  
Genes play a curious role in current debates over reproductive 
technology and parental status. On the one hand, genes are often 
treated as the essence of parenthood.186 On the other hand, the sale of 
gametes has become normal and accepted: Although some people 
                                                          
184
 But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The Child’s 
Fundamental Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297 (2005). 
185
 Cf. Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach 
to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal 
Theory, 84 Ky. L.J. 1197, 1205 (1996) (“Postliberal feminists … tend to insist that 
persons ‘arrive’ in the world already inextricably imbedded in webs of 
relationships—in social contexts that in great part determine who they are and 
what they will become as individuals, as well as where their responsibilities will 
lie.”). 
186
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993) (analogizing a 
gestational surrogate to a foster mother and awarding parental status to the genetic 
parents); Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(awarding parental status to the genetic parents after their embryo was mistakenly 
implanted in another woman). 
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question the moral effects of commodifying gametes and the 
exploitation that can occur in gamete markets, that horse has long 
since left the barn in the United States. What is curious is that the 
mystical status of genes has survived their commodification.187 It 
suggests, perhaps, that reverence for property rights is at least as 
strong as, and may form the basis of, the reverence for DNA. The 
combination of genes and property produces the rule that Byrn and 
Ives propose for assigning parents to a child: genes in cases of sexual 
reproduction, contracts for reproduction through technology. The 
legal parents are either the genetic parents or the people to whom the 
genetic parents sold their genes. 
While the sale of genes is widely accepted, the sale of gestation 
remains somewhat more controversial. Oddly, the sale of gestation is 
especially disfavored when it coincides with the sale of an egg: The 
law that is emerging through court decisions and statutes in many 
states contains a marked preference for “gestational surrogacy” 
through IVF over “full surrogacy” through insemination of the 
surrogate.188 This preference is anomalous in light of the acceptance 
of gamete sales as unproblematic. 
This preference for gestational surrogacy and the combination of 
genetics and contract principles proposed by Byrnes and Ives both 
reflect a distortion of the biology-plus-relationship test. Under the 
distorted version of the test, “biology” refers to genes, while 
“relationship” refers to pregnancy or other caretaking. Contract rules 
are able to overcome genes alone or gestation alone, but not both 
together.189 A full surrogate, like the unwed fathers protected by the 
Supreme Court, has a genetic and caretaking relationship with the 
child. A gestational surrogate, however, has only the caretaking, and 
                                                          
187
 Cf. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 233 (noting the incongruity that in surrogacy 
contracts the sperm is used to define the child as belonging to the man, but that 
men can also buy sperm and use it “as their ‘own’ to make their ‘own’ baby with a 
surrogate”). 
188
 See, e.g., Jamie L. Zuckerman, Extreme Makeover—Surrogacy Edition: 
Reassessing the marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and 
the Right to Revoke consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. 
REV. 661, 667-71 (2008) (discussing the distinctions between traditional and 
gestational surrogacy contracts under Florida law, including that only the latter are 
enforceable). 
189
 Cf. Noa Ben-Asher, Baby-Making and Baby-Meaning: The Two Triangles of 
Reproductive Technology, SSRN (observing an apparent “2-1 rule” in which 
intended parents can purchase up to two components (egg, sperm, and gestation) 
but must provide the third). 
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thus is not a parent. Under this version of the biology-plus-
relationship test, a child born to a gestational surrogate arguably has 
no legal parent at the time of birth. She acquires a parent only 
through execution of the surrogacy contract and formation of a 
caretaking relationship with the intended parents.190 
This application of the biology-plus-relationship test is incorrect 
because pregnancy is a biological relationship as well as a caretaking 
one. As Rothman says, the gestational mother is related to the child 
“by blood”: not “the metaphorical blood of the genetic tie” but “the 
real blood of the pulsing cord, the bloody show, the blood of 
birth.”191 It is therefore error to equate “biology” in the biology-plus-
relationship test to genes. To do so is to use men as the norm and say 
that because biological parenthood for men is limited to genetics, it 
must be limited for women too. 
Finally, apart from the child’s interests, the rule for assigning 
children to parents needs to protect the interest in pluralism. 
Enforcing surrogacy contracts is not the same as having the state 
select the parents it prefers. Nonetheless, the free market has its own 
                                                          
190
 Under contract principles, the usual argument is that the intended parents are 
entitled to specific performance because the object of the contract is unique; surely, 
all can agree that a single human child is unique and irreplaceable. This argument 
admits that the child is the object of the contract; that is, that the child is being 
sold. In addition, it is not quite true that this particular child was the object of the 
contract, or that what was contracted for was unique. The intended parents 
contracted for “a child,” made either from their own genes or from others. There is 
a very large number of potential children that could have resulted. The particular 
child who was born is different from all the other potential children only once she 
is encountered and known, so that at  birth she is unique only from the perspective 
of the gestator. That uniqueness springs not only from the unique combination of 
DNA. 
Moreover, the connection to a unique individual is what justifies allowing 
parents to act on behalf of their children. See Emily Buss, “Parental Rights,” 88 
VA. L. REV. 635, 649-50 (2002) (arguing that a primary reason for deference to 
parental choices is that “the parent knows herself, her child, and her entire 
household better than the state knows them”). A gestational mother who decides, 
after birth, to place a child for adoption is at that time entitled to act on the child’s 
behalf, and to make a decision about what would be best, not solely for the child 
but also for herself and other family members. Because it is the child who is most 
deeply affected by this transaction, some party to the transaction needs to be 
entitled to act on the child’s behalf. At the time that a surrogacy contract is signed, 
however, none of the signatories has established an individuated relationship with 
the child to be created. None is entitled to act on that child’s behalf. Thus the child 
becomes the object of the contract rather than an interested party. 
191
 ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 45. 
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biases that are inconsistent with pluralist aims. The body and the 
physical connection of caretaking that occurs over the course of 
gestation are a better basis for defining family than the market. 
B. GHOST IN THE MACHINE 
The claim that the gestator should be the legal parent assumes 
human gestation. That is, if parental status must vest in the gestator, 
then the gestator must be human; we are not going to assign parental 
rights to other animals or to mechanical incubators. This Part carries 
out the thought experiment of artificial gestation through a lens that 
rejects the Aristotelian dichotomies: between the active and the 
passive; between the spiritual form and the material environment; 
between the woman and the fetus. It concludes that there is not, at 
this time, sufficient basis for prohibiting private, voluntary 
ectogenesis.192 However, state-initiated ectogenesis, whether as an 
alternative to abortion or otherwise, should be prohibited.193 That is, 
a child does not necessarily have a right to a human gestational 
mother as against the parents who seek to bring her into the world by 
other means. The state, on the other hand, may neither permit 
children to be grown ectogenecially under its auspices nor create 
intentional orphans by mandating artificial gestation in lieu of 
abortion. 
1. Voluntary Use of Ectogenesis 
Two principles support the conclusion that voluntary use of 
ectogenesis by prospective parents should be permitted. The first is 
the general presumption in favor of individual liberty. Second, 
although our constitutional understanding of parenthood is modeled 
on pregnancy, it does not require that pregnancy be the exclusive 
means of establishing a parental relationship; other ways of forming 
that connection are equally valuable. Although concerns about 
commodification of children and general alienation of people from 
their physical connectedness are substantial, they do not support a 
ban at this time. 
Citizens in a liberal democracy are presumed to be entitled to 
make their own decisions, absent a showing of harm to others or to 
society as a whole. This principle is especially strong in the context 
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 See infra, Part III.B.1. 
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 See infra, Part III.B.2. 
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of reproductive matters.194 Protecting individual choices in 
reproduction and child-rearing respects people’s desire to be 
autonomous in their intimate lives, and it restrains the state. The 
more diffuse and decentralized reproductive decisions are, the better 
able society is to avoid the systematic effects of institutional biases 
and mistakes.195 Moreover, the effects of artificial womb technology 
will depend more on the nature of society than on the nature of the 
technology.196 Just as Shalumith Firestone saw the potential for 
liberatory uses of such technology but did not expect the technology 
itself to produce liberation,197 the potential for harmful uses flows 
from society not from the machine. 
If ectogenesis is used voluntarily for procreation, in most cases 
the resulting child would be welcomed into a waiting family. It 
would seem strange to say in those circumstances that the child’s 
rights have been violated. The waiting parent would have invested a 
great deal, financially and otherwise, in the child. This intended 
parent would be analogous to the partner of a pregnant woman who 
supports the pregnancy in the ways she can. The doctrine is currently 
unclear whether such pre-birth conduct can satisfy the relationship 
prong of the biology-plus-relationship test.198 If, however, it can do 
                                                          
194
 Dien Ho, Leaving People Alone: Liberalism, Ectogenesis, and the Limits of 
Medicine, in ECTOGENESIS 139, 144 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, eds., 2006) 
(applying the libertarian presumption, referred to as the principle of default 
autonomy, to the choice to use an artificial womb); Callahan & Roberts, supra note 
185, at 1221 (distinguishing criticism and discouragement of reproductive 
technology from prohibition). 
195
 This includes those who believe life begins at conception and wish to aid frozen 
embryos but lack the ability to gestate naturally as well as those who prefer to 
avoid pregnancy for reasons of their own. 
196
 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal 
Structure of the New Reproduction, 159 S. CAL L. REV. 939, 1033 (1986) (“In the 
final analysis, the impact of noncoital technology on women depends on how it is 
used more than on what it is. While opportunity for misuse exists, there is a 
reasonable basis for thinking that people on the whole will use it well.”); Woolfrey, 
supra note 33, at 129-30, 134-37. For example, artificial gestation could be seen as 
a way to address infertility without the potential exploitation of human surrogacy. 
See Tong, supra note 27, at 70. 
197
 See FIRESTONE, supra note 29, at 8-9, discussed supra, text accompanying notes 
29-31. 
198
 See E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: 
Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-
Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 124-26 (1998) (arguing that pre-birth 
conduct would be sufficient only in extraordinary circumstances). 
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so in cases of natural gestation, then the intended parent of an 
ectogenic child should similarly be able to establish a protected 
relationship with the developing child. Some parents might even feel 
more connected to a child developing in the machine than to one 
growing inside a partner or a paid gestational mother.199 Perhaps, for 
example, the machine would have a window; visually oriented 
people might feel closer because they could see the fetus. Because 
the biology-plus relationship test uses pregnancy as a model but does 
not hold it to be superior to other ways of forming a parental 
relationship, it does not suggest that the wanted ectogenic child has 
been seriously deprived. 
For these reasons, it is too soon to say that we should ban 
artificial gestation. There are, however, three primary concerns about 
the effects of artificial gestation that warrant caution and could 
justify restrictions if the worst-case scenarios materialize. The first 
concerns the commodification of children; the second concerns the 
potential for undue social pressure to forego natural gestation; and 
the third concerns the intrinsic self of the child. 
First, the primary concern about commodification is that 
prospective parents will expect to be able to walk away from the 
artificial womb if they are not satisfied with the product. In our 
consumer society, this attitude has already appeared in a few 
surrogacy cases.200 With ectogenesis, everyone who participated in 
the child’s conception would have the physical ability to do what a 
pregnant woman cannot: walk away. It is easier to walk away from a 
microscopic embryo than from a newborn baby. It is easier to walk 
away if you are a medical tourist in a poor country. Even when it is 
presumably hard to walk away, parents do. On the other hand, people 
who seek parenthood through technology have often exhausted other 
means and dearly wish to have a child. The vast majority of parents 
who rely on gestational surrogates raise the resulting child. While in 
a few cases intended parents have tried to refuse custody, they appear 
to have done so on the assumption that the gestational surrogate 
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 See Beth Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change…: Abortion Politics and 
the Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, SSRN (describing how 
seeing an embryo or fetus on ultrasound can influence a woman to think of herself 
as a mother, even before an in vitro embryo is implanted). 
200
 Cf. Tom Blackwell, Couple urged surrogate to abort fetus due to defect, 
NATIONAL POST, Oct. 6, 2010,   
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/Couple+urged+surrogate+abort+fetus+defect/3
628756/story.html. 
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would otherwise keep the child. Such abandonment might thus be 
less likely when it is clear that no other “mother” is available. Only if 
experience demonstrates that ectogenesis increases the chances of the 
child becoming parentless would prohibition become appropriate. 
Second, insurance companies, employers, or a society repulsed 
by the physical body might pressure women to avoid natural 
gestation, perhaps in a dystopian Brave New World.201 This concern 
warrants caution and regulation to ameliorate such pressure, but not 
an anticipatory ban.202 
Finally, some commentators, including Rothman, have 
expressed the concern that a child created through artificial gestation 
would be a “little alien,” a stranger to the human family who arrives 
without the concrete connection of a blood and flesh relationship.203 
This concern is not directed at concrete developmental impairments 
that might result from some reproductive technology; we have 
assumed those away by positing the availability of safe and reliable 
machines. Rather, the concern is an existential one. Does the creation 
of children in this way represent a fundamental rejection of human 
connectedness, our nature as social beings? This is a serious concern. 
But it is a leap to suppose that this existential question will inherently 
affect the individual child herself, as opposed to affecting the general 
society’s understanding of human nature. Moreover, given that 
technology has a way of creating its own inevitability, it is unwise to 
suggest that a group of children who may come into existence 
whether we approve or not are in some way non-human.204 As 
discussed below, these concerns are part of the reason to prohibit 
state use of ectogenesis, but to rely on them to prohibit voluntary 
ectogenesis would inappropriately romanticize natural gestation. 
2. State Use of Artificial Wombs 
Although a child is not necessarily entitled to a human 
gestational mother, a child is entitled to be assigned at birth to 
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 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); see Sander-Staudt, supra note 
67, at 114. 
202
 See generally Gelfand, supra note 89, at 98-103 (proposing strategies for 
regulating ectogenesis with respect to insurance and employment). 
203
 ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 103. 
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 Consider, for example, the dystopia imagined in KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET 
ME GO (2005), in which clones are created through ectogenesis and raised in 
orphanages to be used as organ donors; the cloned children are believed to lack 
souls. Or the medieval recipe for artificial gestation, which was said to produce a 
child without a soul, discussed supra, note 45. 
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parent(s) who have a concrete relationship to the child that is 
reasonably likely to cause the parents to act in the child’s interest. 
For this reason, the state should not be permitted to initiate the 
creation of parent-less children through artificial gestation, whether 
from the point of conception or as a mandatory alternative to 
abortion. 
To begin with the easier case, the state should not be permitted 
to create ectogenic children on its own initiative. While most readers 
will quickly agree with this proposition, the discussion below 
highlights two of the reasons why this proposition is important. The 
first is the value of human connection and relationship. The second is 
the political role of the family and the concept of family citizenship. 
a. Human Connection 
People are social creatures. In daily life, we define ourselves not 
by mythical DNA programming but by our relationships within 
families, subcultures, nations, and a species. Each level is part of 
both self-definition and the political organization through which we 
express and act on our needs and ideals. Gestation creates a 
belongingness that is simultaneous with the child’s emergence as a 
separate being. It locates the child in a particular position within the 
human community and defines her not in isolation but in relation to 
others. Freestanding ectogenesis under the control of the state would 
challenge this understanding of the human condition. 
This connectedness of pregnancy plays an important role in 
cultural feminist theory. The experience of pregnancy and related 
biological functions are said to foster in women a greater sense of 
connection to others and a greater capacity for empathy.205 If that is 
true, then frequent use of ectogenesis would decrease the quantity of 
empathy available in society as a whole. Overall alienation from the 
body and from others would be increased. 
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the correlation between 
female embodiedness and relational capacity is created at the 
individual level. Girls and women may exhibit a typically “female” 
sense of connectedness without having experienced any uniquely 
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 See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1-4 (1988) 
(outlining the connection thesis); Sander-Staudt, supra note 67, at 117 (“Care 
ethicists speculate that the physical aspects of women’s reproductive biology can 
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female biological capacity beyond living in a female body.206 The 
association between pregnancy and a female capacity for relationship 
appears to operate at a cultural rather than an individual level. As 
liberal feminists would point out, ectogenesis could be valuable 
precisely because it would disrupt the association of women with 
providing care. 
This disruption would come at the cost of rejecting and 
devaluing embodied care. More fundamentally, it would also disrupt 
the association between being human and being cared for.207 It is, 
after all, not only women who experience the connection of 
pregnancy; it is everyone, at least so far. Rather than looking at 
pregnancy and concluding that women are especially connected to 
others, we could conclude that everyone begins in a fundamental 
state of connection. 
Voluntary ectogenesis by individuals could also further 
deteriorate any cultural sense of connection, but it has other benefits 
and would be understood as a medically needed substitute for the 
usual connection of gestation. State-initiated ectogenesis, however, 
has no such redeeming purpose. Much more so than individual use of 
artificial wombs, it would produce “little strangers” without a place 
in the human community. 208 
b. Family Citizenship 
Belongingness in a family can be analogized to belongingness in 
other political communities. In the United States, membership in a 
family and membership in the political community are defined 
through the same act of birth: “All persons born … in the United 
States … are citizens of the United States, and of the State in which 
they reside.”209 In other words, if you are born here, then you are part 
of us. While this clause has rarely been construed by the Supreme 
Court, the Court’s decisions about immigration law reveal the values 
embodied in Citizenship Clause. When parents transmit citizenship to 
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 The foundational psychological work in this area, CAROL GILLIAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982), focused on moral development in children. 
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 It is possible that this disruption would operate on the individual level by 
interfering with the ectogenic child’s relational capacity. See Sander-Staudt, supra 
note 67, at 121. 
208
 Cf. ROTHMAN, supra note 4, at 103 (“Grown outside of a woman, outside of the 
human community, we would indeed create an alien baby, a little stranger, the 
living reification of our ideology.”). 
209
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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their children, the connection with the mother that arises from the act 
of birth is an important part of the political connection that gives rise 
to a right to citizenship.210 
The family is also a political institution, and initial membership 
has, traditionally, been established according to jus soli: a child’s 
family is defined according to the woman from whom she emerges. 
While a non-gestating parent can establish some connections with a 
developing child, the child’s initial connection is with the gestator, 
and with other people only through her. For the state to create a child 
in an artificial womb would be to create the family-level equivalent 
of a stateless person. Just as the state cannot deny citizenship to a 
child born here, the state should not be able to deny family 
membership to a child by creating her as an intentional orphan. The 
child would be “born without the presence of a woman who is most 
likely to have a physical and psychological bond to her.”211 While a 
stateless person might find a home and an artificially gestated child 
might find a family, this is not a condition to be desired or sought. 
c. The Morality of Abortion 
The proposition that the state should not be permitted to produce 
family-less children to be raised as wards of the state should be 
uncontroversial. The remainder of this section argues that the 
conclusion should be no different with respect to a more contested 
issue, state use of ectogenesis as a mandatory alternative to abortion. 
Moreover, this conclusion is warranted whether it is the state alone 
that wishes to use an artificial womb to continue the fetus’s 
development after an abortion or whether it is the state in 
combination with the genetic father. 
Two preliminary matters must be mentioned. First, recall that 
the technology necessary for ectogenesis to serve as an alternative to 
abortion may be more complex than what is needed for complete 
ectogenesis. In addition, extraction of the fetus for transfer to a 
machine is likely to be more invasive and risky to the pregnant 
woman than standard methods of abortion. One could argue that she 
has the right to refuse the extraction procedure due to those increased 
risks. However, the Supreme Court has recently laid the groundwork 
for permitting the state to impose health risks on women in the name 
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 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64-68 (2001) (stating that the connection to 
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of its interest in the fetus; it may conclude that only substantial 
additional risks should be prohibited.212 Let us assume, then, that the 
transfer itself is either medically neutral, as compared to regular 
abortion, or that the additional risk is not so great as to trouble the 
Supreme Court. 
Second, recall that the state demand for artificial gestation after 
abortion will mean, in most cases, that women who otherwise would 
have had abortions will instead carry their pregnancies to term. 
Women who consider abortion to be a moral choice are unlikely to 
feel the same way about artificial gestation.213 To compel artificial 
gestation would be to compel motherhood (or illegal abortion) in our 
ectogenic future as surely as a ban on abortion does so today. 
Turning to the main argument, the notion that the state can 
mandate artificial gestation is premised on the general notion that the 
state can act on behalf of the embryo or fetus, against the mother.214 
This premise is different from the state acting on behalf of a future 
child, such as by supporting maternal health for the sake of the future 
child. Rather, the very question is whether the embryo is to become a 
child. The specific premise is thus that a woman seeking an abortion 
has an inherent conflict of interest with the embryo. This premise is 
based on the traditional ideology of reproduction. Rejecting that 
ideology and the dichotomy between the woman’s body and the 
developing embryo also requires rejecting the belief that state-
mandated ectogenesis is a moral solution to an unwanted pregnancy. 
The concept of “maternal-fetal conflict” appears frequently in 
discussions of pregnancy and reproduction.215 Such a conflict is in 
one sense inherent in every pregnancy. From a genetic perspective, 
the fetus’s genes “want” to use as much of the mother’s 
physiological resources as they can, while the mother’s genes “want” 
to invest appropriately in this potential offspring but also to preserve 
resources for existing and possible future children.216 The same 
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 See supra, note 119 (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)). 
213
 See Cannold, supra note 120, at 58-61. 
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 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (identifying the state interest in the 
potential life of the fetus). 
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 See generally Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking 
the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 
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 See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 129 (1989) (discussing the 
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conflict of interest exists, however, with respect to any particular 
ovum or sperm, each of which contains genes that “want” to be 
reproductively successful. A person who uses birth control or seeks 
an abortion is making a decision not to create a child at a particular 
time in order to conserve resources (in a very broad sense of the 
word) for herself and for her family, including existing and future 
children.217 
A conflict of interest, in this sense, between a woman and the 
genes of the ova, sperm, zygote, or embryo contained in her body is 
not necessarily a conflict of interest between the woman and the 
inchoate child of which any of those genes might become a part. 
That would be so only under the genetic determinist view that vests 
individual identity in the zygote. To posit state-mandated artificial 
gestation as a legitimate alternative to abortion is to overlook the 
moral claim of a woman having an abortion to make a decision not to 
reproduce, taking into account her family interests as well as her 
own. It is a decision “that continuing the pregnancy would harm her 
maternal/fetal-child unit.”218 
Proponents of mandatory ectogenesis in lieu of abortion have 
also failed to distinguish the current situation involving frozen 
embryos. The emerging consensus position is that those embryos can 
be gestated only with the consent of their progenitors; the state 
cannot declare them available to any willing gestator.219 Why, then, 
could the state do so with respect to in vivo embryos that are 
aborted? Indeed, the latter proposal is more extreme, since the state 
would mandate gestation even without willing parents ready to care 
for the child after birth.220 Only two reasons might distinguish the 
                                                                                                                                      
fetus’s genes actually “prefer” to allow the mother to care for siblings, but that 
point comes beyond the point where the mother’s genes would prefer her to do so. 
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two cases. First, proponents may be imagining relatively late 
abortions, in which the fetus more plausibly resembles a human child  
than an early embryo. If so, however, we are back where we started, 
in need of a means for determining when a fetus is entitled to 
gestation. That is no solution to the abortion debate at all. Second, 
proponents may be responding to the status and duty of the pregnant 
woman rather than to the status of the embryo. That is, the difference 
between an in vitro and an in vivo embryo is that the latter has been 
inside a woman, which defines her as a mother with a duty to 
nurture, thus conferring on the embryo a right to be nurtured. This 
possibility would render the ectogenic “solution” to abortion merely 
another manifestation of the ideology that motherhood is obligatory. 
Moreover, in some cases, women would accept the state’s terms 
and undergo fetal extraction and transfer to an artificial womb in lieu 
of abortion. The state would thereby inflict the same harms on the 
resulting child as if it were to initiate conception and gestation on its 
own. That is, the child would be born an orphan, with no 
individuated, caretaking relationship with any adult. While children 
today can become orphans at birth, their connection to a mother who 
dies in childbirth also connects them, most of the time, to an 
extended family. A child born because the government decided a 
fetus had to be gestated is an orphan in an even lonelier sense of the 
word. 
This harm to the child would be reduced if a family awaited her, 
which raises the question whether the genetic father ought to be able 
to insist on artificial gestation in lieu of abortion. There are two 
reasons why he should not. First is the reality, discussed above, that 
the threat of artificial gestation will serve primarily to coerce women 
to remain pregnant. Second is the analogy to current doctrine 
regarding frozen embryos. The emerging view is that a woman is 
entitled to gestate such an embryo over the objection of the genetic 
father only if it represents her only reasonable opportunity to have 
her own genetic child.221 There is no reason to give a genetic father 
greater authority over an embryo merely because it has once been 
inside a woman, especially when that power is so susceptible to 
abuse. Once again, far from solving the debate over abortion, new 
                                                          
221
 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (“Ordinarily, the party 
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a 
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the 
preembryos in question.”). 
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technology will require a deeper resolution of the problems of 
women’s relationship with the institution of motherhood. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Artificial womb technology should not be the solution of choice 
for problems of infertility. Ideological bias that permeates 
reproductive science suggests that current expectations about the 
feasibility of artificial gestation are over-optimistic. Moreover, to the 
extent that the technology emerges from efforts to assist premature 
infants, this technology will have beneficial uses but also the 
potential to do harm. For the former to prevail will require a cultural 
and legal change from our current construction of pregnancy, which 
the current fantasy of artificial wombs and their potential uses is 
helping to maintain. Although individual use of ectogenic technology 
should be cautiously allowed, the state should neither use artificial 
wombs to create orphans nor threaten to do so as a means for 
coercing women to continue unwanted pregnancies. 
